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THEORY OF VALUE IN HARTMANN'S ETHICS

by

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
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INTRODUCTION

1. Problem of the Thesis

The problem of this thesis is the investigation and criticism of Hartmann's theory of value as presented in his Ethics.

It is evident, when one considers the whole of the Ethics, that Hartmann's main concern is the dignity and significance of man in a world which he believes to be completely mechanistic, and which is indifferent to those things which man considers most important. His theory of value is his attempt to provide a satisfactory hypothesis as to the nature of values and their relation to reality, with the special aim of finding in this nature and relation a task for man which he alone can do. If man alone, of all the ontological beings, can perform a task so cosmically important as the imparting of values to reality, then his sense of dignity and significance is not a mere anthropocentric illusion, but must be recognized by whatever cosmic powers there may be.

Theory of value or axiology will be understood to mean, throughout the thesis, a theory which attempts to answer questions as to the nature of values, their relation to reality, to real beings, and to each other.

To attempt to set a definition for value which would hold throughout the thesis would presume upon the problem of

the thesis since just such definition is a part of value theory. However, value may be understood to mean the quality (or qualities) of an object of a value judgment which causes it to be desirable. Objects of value judgments may be things, relations, persons, or personal dispositions. This much can be said without prejudice to any definition Hartmann might propose or assume. These qualities may be said to inhere in objects, or in the nature of the subject, or in the relation between the two, or, another possibility, they may be independent of all these and enter into them only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.

To determine Hartmann's answers to these and related problems, and to criticize them, is the aim of the thesis.

2. Previous Literature

Very little has been written in English concerning Hartmann's theory of value, or for that matter, concerning his Ethics. Following the publication of the work in German in 1926, and then again following its publication in English in 1933, a number of reviews appeared, together with some articles on various aspects of Hartmann's thought. These reviews were, for the most part, short, superficial and uncritical, shedding little or no light on the problem of the thesis.

Of the articles written regarding Hartmann's system, four have some bearing on the present problem. Three of

these appeared in the International Journal of Ethics. The first of these, written by Sidney Hook, appeared in 1930.¹ The second, by Howard Eaton, was published in 1932,² and M. G. Walker's article comparing the theories of Hartmann and Perry, in 1938.³ In addition to these articles, a fourth was published in the Philosophical Review in 1939, written by Roger Hazelton.⁴

Hook, in his article "A Critique of Ethical Realism", recognizes the importance of Hartmann's work as a contribution to ethical theory, but says, in effect, that everything is admirable about it except the viewpoint.

He condemns the efforts of those, who like Hartmann, would establish an absolute, rigid valuational standard or scale, when values are really fluctuating and dependent upon the social situation in which the individual finds himself. He holds the view that values are dependent upon the needs of the subject and his society and scaled by their consequences upon his welfare.

Although disagreeing with Hartmann's metaphysics, Hook says that naturalist and absolutist alike can be grateful to Hartmann for the detailed consideration which he gives to specific ethical problems in his analysis of moral values.

Finally he disagrees with Hartmann's argument that free-

1. Hook, Art.(1930), 179-210.

2. Eaton, Art.(1932), 20-36.

3. Walker, Art.(1938), 37-61.

4. Hazelton, Art.(1939), 621-632.

dom must be assumed, even if it cannot be proven, to justify the phenomenon of guilt and responsibility. Hook says that these phenomena could be subjectively based on dangerous illusions which might be destructive rather than constructive for man.

Eaton's article on "The Unity of Axiological Ethics" is mainly concerned with Hartmann's treatment of the problem of freedom. He does, however, point out that Hartmann

takes explicitly the position which was only adumbrated in the later work of Meinong and which was implicit in Scheler's ethics, namely, that our emotional experiences provide us with an epistemological "organ", so to speak, co-ordinate with our perceptions and judgments, equipped to report to us not on facts but on values.⁵

This "organ" is important for it enables the subject to have knowledge of what is not yet, of values which are unrealized and hence could not be derived from experience.

Eaton argues that Hartmann is on the right track until he tries to prove some form of freedom. Hartmann admits that the subject as ontological being is determined, but refuses to recognize that this determinism is complete, that even when he pushes the choice of alternatives back to the will, that the will itself is determined by some element, which he cannot explain. Hartmann would establish the subject's freedom by his devotion to ends, but Eaton denies this possibility. He argues that "the scientific minded

5. Eaton, Art.(1932), 26.

ethicist...must abandon the concept of free will ...if he would establish ethics as a science."⁶ Such complete determinism and rejection of the idea of moral freedom seems out of place in ethics where one of the basic postulates is that man is guilty or responsible only in so far as he is free.

Walker, in his article, "Perry and Hartmann: Antithetical or Complementary?" compares the value theories of Perry and Hartmann, with

three startling results: First, many apparent differences resolve themselves into contrasts of terminology rather than meaning. Second, each of the theories is marred by a failure to meet a fundamental aspect of the value situation which can be satisfied only on the opposing view. Third, each of the theories at some one point is led to borrow silently, even unconsciously, from its opponent.⁷

It certainly seems a startling result to find that the difference between a theory of value which says that values are subsistent ideal essences beyond and independent of consciousness, and one which holds that values are purely subjective and entirely dependent upon the desires and interests of the subject, is largely one of terminology.

Walker does not mean to assert that the original point of departure is the same for the two theories, but that in the working out of the further elements of them, that they are quite similar in many respects. Both Perry and Hartmann

6. Eaton, Art.(1932), 35.

7. Walker, Art.(1938), 37-38.

hold that the world is mechanistic and indifferent to value and that man alone can impart values to it. Only persons are carriers of values. They also agree that moral conflict grows out of the complex appeal of a great variety of goods which clamor for man's attention and devotion.⁸

Walker feels that Perry's answer concerning the nature of values, that they are the objects of human interest, is the only convincing answer. But Perry's subjective analysis analyzes away the feeling of obligation of which Hartmann takes due cognizance. Hartmann on the one hand,

neglects the essential relevance of the values to the moral agent; the position of ethical subjectivism [Perry's position] slights the fact of the moral obligation.⁹

Taking the truth of each theory and combining them, one arrives at a concept that is both subjective and objective. Values are subjective in that they are objects of human interest in their very being, but they are objective at least in the sense that they are obligatory for the individual will.¹⁰

Hazelton's article, "On Hartmann's Doctrine of Values As Essences", offers little of value on the problem. It is mainly a clarification of Hartmann's concept of the ideal being of values. Hazelton points out values as conceived by Hartmann are universals which become effective as they are particularized in the realm of Being. Hartmann's insistence

8. See Walker, Art.(1938), 60.

9. Walker, Art.(1938), 47.

10. See Walker, Art.(1938), 60.

upon the materiality of value essences is regarded by him as a recognition of the fact that the alternatives and imperatives presented and felt in the ethical situation are always specific and concrete.¹¹

In addition to these articles, a dissertation and a thesis have been written at Boston University on certain aspects of Hartmann's Ethics.

The dissertation, written by David Iino in 1941, deals specifically with Hartmann's criterion of value, sense of value (Wertgefühl), and his rejection of a theistic world-hypothesis. Yet a large portion of the material regarding the sense of value is relevant to the problem of the thesis.¹²

Iino concludes after examining Hartmann's reasons for the objectivity of values that the sense of value is his sole empirical basis for such a view. Although Hartmann insists that intuition alone guides one to the knowledge or discernment of values, he himself is forced to employ a synoptic criterion to distinguish mistakes in judgments of values.

Hartmann confuses values and ideals. On his view values as defined by Perry are never experienced. His chief error, according to Iino, consists in supposing that all value experience is an intuitive beholding of eternal ideals.

11. See Hazelton, Art.(1939), 629.

12. See Iino, CHE, 44-140.

The thesis, written by Richard Millard, Jr. in 1942, is a study of Hartmann's concept of teleology. Certain parts of it, too, are helpful in this investigation.¹³

He, too, points out Hartmann's persistent confusion of values and ideals. He feels that there is really not so much valuational conflict as Hartmann thinks, but that Hartmann is confusing value-claims with true values. Hartmann creates some of his own difficulties in this way. But his recognition of the importance of human purpose is to be lauded. It is doubtful, however, if it is enough to justify placing man on God's throne.

There is much useful material contained in these sources. They will be referred to frequently as this study develops.

3. Plan of the Thesis

Before it is possible to criticize any theory fairly and intelligently, it is necessary to understand what is maintained in it. This means that it is necessary to consider the whole of the theory before criticizing it. Therefore the plan of this thesis will be to present the whole of Hartmann's theory of value before attempting any critical analysis of its various parts.

The first chapter deals with the nature of values prior

13. See Millard, TNHE, 14-40, 44-53, 58-73, 121-145.

to their discernment by the subject, the means by which they are discerned, and their relation to reality and its categories.

The second chapter is a presentation of Hartmann's theory of the way unrealized values become determinant for real subjects who strive to realize them, finding their own personality and self-realization in the striving. Also included in this chapter is Hartmann's doctrine of freedom.

In the third chapter, the attempt is made to evolve or discover a scale or system of values using the sense of values which is the primary empirical basis for Hartmann's entire value theory.

The fourth chapter is concerned with discovering the basic points of Hartmann's theory and criticizing them on the basis of self-consistency, consistency with the facts of all experience, and finally in relation to other alternative views on the same problem.

The attempt is made throughout the entire thesis to avoid quotations from other sources except where they either make Hartmann's point more clear, or offer a more coherent solution than Hartmann. The assumption has been that the important matter is to get a clear idea of Hartmann's theory and its validity.

CHAPTER I

THE VALUE REALM

1. The Ideal Objectivity of Values

One of the basic questions to be considered in the construction or development of a theory of value concerns the ontological status of values. The differing answers given to this question constitute one of the basic divisions of ethical thought, that of subjectivity or objectivity of values. If values are purely constructs of the subject's consciousness regarding some relation or object which is in some way related to the subject, then values are subjective and relative to the valuations of the individual subject. Even if these valuations are traced to the universal categorizing of the reason, they are still subjective. On the other hand, if values are inherent qualities of things and relations existing independent of, and prior to, their discovery by the subject in empirical nature, then they are regarded as objective and absolute.

For Kant, all principles originated in the subject. The objective manifold was formless and only received meaning, shape, and order through the categorizing activity of the mind. Therefore, when he sought to determine the nature of ethical principles, it was only natural that he should consider them to be of subjective origin. If ethical principles were derived from the objective world of nature, they

would lack the universality and autonomy necessary for moral laws; but if they emanated from reason, they would be universal and a priori, genuine commandments standing over against all natural laws, independent of, and superior to them. Forced to choose between an empirical relativism and a transcendental "subjectivism" (a subjectivism which is a priori and universal), Kant chose the rationally based ethical principles of a transcendental subjectivism.

Hartmann holds that Kant's conclusion was reached by an imperfect disjunction in the presentation of the argument. Kant thought that ethical principles must be derived either from nature or from reason. He was right in thinking that these principles must be known a priori, rather than derived from the empirical presentation. The independence of specific empirical data which is the substance of aprioristic insight is needed, if ethics is to be based upon universal rational principles. Kant, therefore, inferred that the subject adds this insight out of himself.

It is at this point that Hartmann claims Kant erred. There is another possible origin for a priori ethical principles, other than nature or reason. He says,

Must the subject himself create that which has been added?...Is not the reverse also possible? May not the content of what the subject discerns a priori be just as objective as what he perceives a posteriori? That the aprioristic contents are not to be extracted from the real ("empirical") objects as such does not in any way derogate from their objectivity. Geometrical relations cannot indeed be derived from things, not even from drawn figures, but are best illustrated by these; they are none the less on that

account something purely objective, something that can be discerned as objects, and they have nothing to do with the functions of consciousness...And is it otherwise with the categorical imperative? The exacted harmony of the individual will with the Ideal will of all can certainly never be extracted from an empirical will. But from this, does it follow that this requirement is a function, an act, a legislation of reason? Evidently just as little. It also is something purely objective; its content is an ideal objective relation which precisely as such, hovers before the moral consciousness, independently of the degree of its actualization in real life.¹

From all this, it is seen that universal, a priori ethical principles need not be of subjective origin. Their only need is not to have their source in a naturalistic objectivity.

This need is not based on an anti-empirical prejudice but is actually a result of the requirements of the empirical situation. Before one can judge the value or disvalue of his conduct, or of some relation or object, one must already have knowledge of some standard by which the judgment may be made. While it may be true that values are first discovered empirically in some actual situation, this discovery only serves to turn the attention of the ethicist to the principle embodied in the situation. It is the task of philosophical ethics to bring to consciousness the ethical principles which are already present in it. In this manner there is a persistent elaboration of new principles. The valuing consciousness perceives new values presented in new embodiments,

1. Hartmann, ETH, I, 163. In subsequent references to this work, throughout the thesis, the author's name will usually be omitted.

and shifts its gaze to that part of the value realm which contains the values present therein. Values and principles, however, do not change. They are timeless, unaffected by their historical embodiment or lack of it, and equally unaffected by the subject's consciousness of them. They are not recognized by the fact that they are, or are not, contained in the real.

Demonstration of this super-temporal, super-historical nature of values is sufficient proof of the Kantian error and serves to establish an objective source of ethical principles that is not naturalistic. There is

a self-existent ideal sphere in which values are native, and...the contents of this sphere, values, self-subsistent and dependent upon no experience, are discerned a priori.²

This is a part of the answer which Hartmann proposes to give to the question concerning the nature of values. Continuing in the same vein, he says,

Valuational structures are ideal objects, beyond all real Being and Not-Being, also beyond the really existing feeling of value which alone grasps them.³

This form or mode of being is by no means a modern concept. Plato, aware of another realm of being than that of existence in reality and consciousness, named it the realm of the Idea, while the Scholastics called it the realm of essentia. As a result of the Kantian emphasis on subjectivism, this realm was considered outmoded, but now the Phenomenologists have

2. ETH, I, 165.

3. ETH, I, 180.

revived it as the realm of essence.

It is difficult to think what a thing must be like when it is not existent either in reality or in thought, when it neither is nor is not. It is such talk that causes the amateur philosopher or the much discussed "man on the street" to look askance at the philosopher and shake his head significantly. But values possess this ontological status of essences; in their mode of Being they are Platonic ideas.

They belong to that further realm of Being which Plato first discovered, the realm which we can spiritually discern but cannot see or grasp... they are that "though which" everything which participates in them is exactly as it is--namely valuable...Values emanate neither from things (or real relationships) nor from the percipient. No naturalism and no subjectivism attach to their form of Being. Furthermore, they are not "formal" or empty structures, but possess contents; they are "materials", structures which constitute a specific quality of things, relations or persons, according as they attach to them or are lacking.⁴

Neither things nor consciousness emanate from values. Values form a separate and essentially unrelated group within Being. Though always discerned in specific material embodiments, they are yet unaffected either by existents or by consciousness, the other factors in a given situation. Values are absolute and when found in a relational situation, are neither contained in the relation nor derived from it.

The valuableness is different from any given structure and from every relation, although it inheres in them; it is an ens sui generis, an essence of another sort.⁵

4. ETH, I, 185.

5. ETH, I, 217.

While the subject may create or produce the relation in which values inhere, he cannot produce the values. Values are relative only in the sense that the subject may strive to relate them to the relations of which he is a part. But the values confront him as something independent, with an existence or being and energy of their own. As such they are self-existent. They

subsist independently of the consciousness of them. Consciousness can grasp or miss them, but cannot make or spontaneously decree them.⁶

It is not to be thought, however, that values are real existents. As discovered inherent in materials or relations, in goods, or any other form in which value may be found, they may participate in determining reality and may even themselves be actualized. But their essence, their mode of Being always remains ideal.

These values, as such, in comparison with the actual, always have the character of an "Idea", which indeed, when the actual corresponds with it, lends to this the character of a value, but which with its ideal nature still remains on the other side of actualization.⁷

Values may so inhere in an existent relation or object as to lend it the aspect of valuableness. But this is only an apparent relation, for the values are always ideal, and the material to which they are attached is that which is actualized.

From the foregoing it may be seen that Hartmann answers

6. ETH, I, 218.

7. ETH, I, 221.

the question concerning the ontological status or nature of values by declaring them to be ideal self-existents, independent alike of relation to reality or to conscious awareness. When discerned in actual, concrete situations, they are visitors from another realm, never losing their alien characteristics, always retaining their ideality, their citizenship in another world. This other world, the natural abode of values, is the realm of subsistent metaphysical essences, where logical and mathematical essences, indeed all essences, share ideal objectivity.

These essences only inhere in actual relations or objects when discerned or "invited" by an actual being. All their appearances are guest appearances. So long as some actual being is aware of them they may continue to lend the richness of their essences to this realm of actuality.

The concept of ideal objectivity or self-existence is difficult for unsophisticated thought which is prone to regard real actuality alone as self-existent. Two prejudices are largely responsible for this view.

In the first place actuality and Being are falsely identified--although the circle of the "actual" need not be limited to things. Everything that is not actual then belongs without further ado to Not-Being. And, unless one understands this in the Platonic sense as Being of another kind, one can understand it only to mean nothingness.

Secondly, however, ideality is mistaken for subjectivity--a confusion for which the double meaning of the term "idea" is to blame. When "idea" is taken as the equivalent of "presentation", ideality becomes the mode of Being of whatever

subsists only in and for the presentation of a subject; but beyond that it is meaningless...with this meaning an ideal sphere can naturally have no self-existence.⁸

If one will consider these misuses of "idea", it will be easier to think ideal existence meaningfully, as existence in a realm of essence. One will not be so prone to deny it because one does not see it. If it is unseen, the fault lies with the subject and not with the object, for

there is a realm of values subsisting for itself... beyond reality just as much as beyond consciousness. An ethical ideal sphere, not ~~manufactured~~, invented, or dreamed, but actually existing and capable of being grasped in the phenomenon of the feeling for values.⁹

This realm of metaphysical essences, beyond nature and consciousness, is the other possible source of objectivity which Kant fails to consider. It affords the universal, a priori objectivity which he sought. It is not a natural objectivity but an ideal objectivity in the realm of essence. This realm is the source of all genuine ethical principles as well as all values or principles derived from them. Here all values, moral-values, goods-values, situational-values, await discovery.

2. How Values Are Known

Once the value-theorist determines the ontological nature of values, he is confronted with an epistemological problem. How are such values to be known?

8. ETH, I, 222.

9. ETH, I, 226.

In the foregoing discussion of the ideal objectivity of values, it was seen that Hartmann regards values as self-subsistent, ideal essences independent of real existence or conscious awareness. They

are not to be discovered in the conduct of man. On the contrary, one must already have knowledge of them in order to distinguish whether his conduct accords with them or violates them.¹⁰

Hence, an investigation of the ethical principles and practices of man will not reveal the valuational criterion, although an investigation of his valuational intuitions will yield much information regarding it. Such a criterion must already be known to the investigator if he is to judge the value or disvalue of past human conduct or principles. He must possess beforehand the ability to evaluate the things and relations which he finds.

This would seem to suggest the Kantian hypothesis of a categorizing subject which shapes and labels the phenomena presented to it. But Hartmann has already rejected this subjectivism by establishing values as self-existent and independent of conscious activity. They are not produced by thought, nor are they derived by reflection on the facts compiled or observed by students of the phenomena. Even this secondary, philosophical knowledge of values is never obtained from facts alone. Far from being subjective, values "are not even capable of being directly grasped by thought."¹¹

Hartmann has thus rejected both the rational thought

10. ETH, I, 99.

11. ETH, I, 185.

and the moral conduct of men as possible sources for knowledge of values. The values are apparently shut up in their realm and the subject in his with all gates between closed. However, Hartmann, delving more deeply into human experience, discovers that there are empirical ethical phenomena other than the acts and dispositions of men. This ethical other is the feeling or sensing of values which precedes and accompanies the acts and dispositions of the subject, condemning or justifying them. This feeling of values does judge the goodness or badness of the attitudes and conduct of the subject. It does apparently possess the criterion by which to judge the value or disvalue of the things and relations of real existence. Such a feeling for values is a fact of human experience. However,

it is never found in the actual conduct of man, nor in the actual adjustments and historical phenomena of human society, but simply and alone in the primary consciousness of good and evil itself.¹²

While one may travel the world over and amass and study great volumes of sociological information concerning historic and pre-historic man, and never discover the means by which values are known and valuations made, the secret is always with one, immediately at hand in the intuitive capacity to know and appreciate the valuable. All

comprehension of ethical reality--whether it consist of goods, human relations or demands for a personal decision--is always, even for the naivest

12. ETH, I, 101.

consciousness, transfused with valuations, with preferences in accordance with feeling, with strong tensions for or against.¹³

These valuational preferences are not cognitive acts preceded by judgments of the understanding, but are intuitively and immediately present in the grasping of the given circumstance. These emotional preferences penetrate all of reality, lending to everything which falls into the subject's vision the mark of value or disvalue. As a result the ethicist may first discover the principles which he seeks through perception of them in some concrete embodiment in life, but even here the knowledge of the principle is a priori and intuitive, independent of the actual situation which served as a guide to the principle. This use of actual phenomena is only a roundabout way to arrive at aprioristic insight. The inquiry of the ethicist

rests upon the primal feeling of value, and can do nothing except draw out from the total emotional phenomenon the aprioristic content which was already within it. The primary seat of the valuational a priori is the valuational feeling itself which pervades our interpretation of reality and our attitude toward life.¹⁴

Insight into values is always a priori, whether it is this primary feeling of value or the knowledge derived by the reflective investigation of the ethicist.

The knowledge derived by study of the phenomena of valuational feeling may lead to the formulation of laws or prin-

13. ETH, I, 176-177.

14. ETH, I, 178.

ciples of the realm of values. This formulation is desirable and indeed necessary for the better understanding of this ideal realm. It must not be forgotten, however, that the original "feeling of value" is that and nothing more. The principle is a secondary phase in the study of values. This is a significant point for the student of ethical phenomena. His investigations cannot go beyond the living sense of values. The consciousness of value must lead the way into the unknown vastness of the value realm.

The studies of the ethicist have a practical value as well as a theoretical one. The living sense of value of any one group or society may and does discern new sections of the value manifold. As the group feeling for value thus shifts its attention to new values, the other value would vanish from sight were it not for the work of the ethicist who uses the value consciousness of men and societies past and present in an unending endeavor to chart the value realm. Each shift of attention adds to his information regarding the value sphere. And this information may then be used by man as he seeks to systematize values in order to make wiser and better choices when values compete for his attention and devotion.

To make the nature of the consciousness of value more clear, Hartmann says,

that which we call conscience is at bottom just this primal consciousness of value, which is found in the feeling of every person...The well-known way in which "conscience" expresses itself fits most exactly

the emotional consciousness, the obscure, half-conscious sense of value, which speaks unsummoned and does not reveal its inner content. The so-called "voice of conscience" is perhaps the most elemental way in which the sense of value gains currency among men.¹⁵

Coming as it does, uncalled for, unannounced, even unwanted, it opens the door to a higher power from another world--the ideal realm of values. Conscience makes known the manifestation of ideal beings, values, in the reality of human life. Values, in their ideal objectivity, "are then the 'condition of possibility' of conscience."¹⁶

The phenomenon of conscience thus serves a twofold purpose. It is a form of the intuitional consciousness of value, and it is clear evidence of the objective actuality of values. Standing as judge of the subject it disproves any last claim to validity which subjectivism might have.

Hartmann has answered two of the basic questions of value-theory, namely, What is the ontological status of values? and How are values known? Values are ideal essences, self-existent, subsisting beyond Being and Not-Being, independent of, and unaffected by, reality or consciousness, yet known to consciousness as inherent in real existence through an intuitive, a priori discernment or feeling of their presence.

15. ETH, I, 200-201.

16. ETH, I, 202.

3. The Relation of Values to Reality

Values are ideal essences. As such they are independent of reality or real existents. But like all forms of ideal Being, they have some relation to reality. This relation exists in an area of agreement where the two spheres overlap. In this area of coincidence the ideal principles become categories or laws of real existence. While the spheres of ideality and reality may extend far beyond this area of coincidence, it is only the ideality contained in this area which is of significant and pressing interest for a real subject. Even if theoretical interest in the content of the ideal realm were to urge the subject on to further study of it, he would be limited to this real embodiment of the ideal principle for data to study. Thus the limit would still be that of the coincident areas.


With values this situation is altered. The relation between values and reality differs in two significant ways from the relation between reality and other ideal essences. The first of these differences has to do with the nature and power of the ideal in its real manifestation, when "actualized". Logical or mathematical essences, when actualized become categories or principles of real existence. As such, they are universal and necessary ways in which real existents and subjects act or are acted upon. Values, however, are not categories of the real. It is true that there is an area of interpenetration in which there is agreement between the

ideal ethical sphere and the real ethical sphere. In this area values may inhere in reality, may be actualized. But here the difference appears. "Over against the real they signify only a claim, an Ought-to-Be, no inevitable necessity, no real compulsion."¹⁷ Whereas other ideal principles, when actualized, become determinant for reality, values must await the determinations of real subjects. The subject is not subordinate to them. They can press their claim to actuality and authority only through some form of the sense of value previously discussed. But the will of the subject can counteract the consciousness of value or the voice of conscience.

This dependence of values upon the subject is the first important difference between the relation of values and reality, and other ideal forms and reality. While the other ideal forms when coincident with reality are categorically determinant for real existents, values when thus coincident are only conditionally determinant principles. The condition is their acceptance by a real subject.

The second difference between values and other ideal essences in relation to reality has to do with the extent of significant influence over the real possessed by the ideal form. For the other essences, this influence is quite strong, but is limited to the area in which the two spheres overlap and the ideal is actualized. Values, on the contrary, are relatively weak as actual determinants, but their influence

17. ETH, I, 98.



transcends the limitations of coincidence of the two spheres. By this transcendence, values which are not contained in the area where the two spheres are coincident, and which are not actualized, submit their claim to reality. It is in the nature of values to tend toward reality and this tendency expresses itself as an ideal "Ought-to-Be" whether the value is actualized or not. This "claim holds good, even where it is not, indeed even where it cannot be carried out."¹⁸

This tendential Ought attaching to values is the outreach of the ideal ethical realm and expresses itself as a sanction of real situations and objects in which values inhere. They are just as they ought to be. When values do not inhere in reality, indeed when reality contradicts their Being, then the ideal Ought-to-Be becomes a positive Ought-to-Be.

Ethical ideal self-existence is not indifferent to the ethical reality which contradicts it; it fixes the contradiction as a relation of opposition and strain, and denies the real which contradicts it, however well founded this may be ontologically; it stamps it as contradictory to value and sets against it the idea of its own proper structure.¹⁹

This contradiction and condemnation of reality by values creates a state of tension, marks the real as something which Ought-Not-to-Be, and proclaims the unactualized values alone as what Ought-to-Be. As a positive Ought-to-Be opposed to what Is, the unactualized value becomes a dynamic potential

18. ETH, I, 98.

19. ETH, I, 233.

circumstances the distinction of objectivity of the two concepts. By this circumstance, values which are not contained in the state where the two objects are coincident, and which are not actualized, submit their claim to reality. It is in the nature of values to tend toward reality and this tendency expresses itself as an ideal "ought-to-be" whether the value is actualized or not. This "ought-to-be" holds good, even where it is not, indeed even where it cannot be carried out.

This essential ought attending to values is the basis of the ideal ethical norm and expresses itself as a sanction of real situations and objects in which values are present. They are just as they ought to be. When values are not there in reality, indeed when reality contradicts their being, then the ideal ought-to-be becomes a positive demand-to-

Be:

Ethical ideal and existence is not indifferent to the ethical reality which contradicts it; it gives the contradiction as a rejection of contradiction, it strives, and hence the real which contradicts it, however well founded this way of understanding it seems, it is contradictory to value and acts against it the line of its own proper development.

This contradiction and condemnation of reality by values are also a state of tension, namely the fact as such which is not to be, and contradicts the actualized values of the state. As a positive ought-to-be opposed to what is, the unactualized value becomes a dynamic potential.

capable of opposing the force of real categories and making them serve its own ends.

Values thus tend

to shape in higher fashion the categorial world already formed, supplementing this by their highest structures, personal entities, and building it up according to their own pattern, the pattern of the ideal essences.²⁰

When the discerning subject wills to correct the situation in accordance with the claim of the discerned values, then these values, despite their conditional determinacy, prove more efficient than are the categories of Being. For values are creative principles, capable of transforming ideality into reality, Not-Being into Being. This transformation is effected by the Ought which attaches to every value and clamors for realization through the agency of the discerning subject.

In discussing the ideal objectivity of values, no mention was made of any Ought attached to them. The Ought only becomes evident when the relation to the values and reality is considered for it is an Ought-to-Be, and values as ideal essences are beyond Being and Not-Being. It must be made clear however, that "the Ought belongs to the essence of the value and must be already contained in its ideal mode of existence."²¹ As regards Being, the ideal Ought-to-Be is the proper mode of Being of value, and the value is the content of the Ought. Because a value is self-existent, it does not follow that it is a moral obligation for some real subject. It does

20. ETH, I, 241.

21. ETH, I, 247.

mean, however, that it should be actualized, it ought to "Be".

Thus universal peace ought to "Be". This does not mean that peace is or may be, but only that it is valuable and should be actualized. Such an Ought-to-Be attaches to every value, and is independent of Being and Not-Being. It includes, however, the tendency toward reality, and condemns reality in which it is not realized.

The positive Ought-to-Be is a result of the transcendence of the area of agreement of the ideal and real spheres by values. The tension created by the non-agreement of the two spheres is precisely the actuality of this positive Ought-to-Be. Thus while the ideal Ought-to-Be attaches to values independently of opposition or reality, the positive Ought-to-Be can attach to values only in relation to their non-existence in a real world.

Here the preliminary definition of the value realm ends. Values, as self-existent ideal essences, are known to real subjects intuitively through a "sense of value". They subsist independently of their actualization in reality, but exhibit a tendency to be actualized. This tendency to "Be" attaches to all values as an ideal Ought-to-Be. When ideal-ity is opposed by reality, this ideal Ought-to-Be becomes a positive Ought-to-Be which gains in strength as the tension between the two spheres increases. Thus the ideal realm of values is related to reality in one of two ways. Either it is related to reality by values inherent in reality and

actualized as other ideal forms or it is related to reality in a relation of opposition by values which do not inhere in reality but rather contradict it.

The task of this chapter has been to determine the general nature of the value realm in Hartmann's theory of value. Later it will be necessary and desirable to investigate more thoroughly the nature of this realm. But the next task is to continue the work begun here and determine how values opposed by the categories and existents of reality may yet be actualized.

CHAPTER II

VALUE REALIZATION

1. Finalistic and Causal Determination

In the previous chapter values were depicted as independent of reality, yet capable, to a certain extent, of entering into it and reshaping it, building it according to their own ideal pattern. This redirection of the processes of reality is not accomplished by the direct action of the values themselves, but through the activity of a mediating subject who discerns that these values ought to be, sets them up as ends, and purposefully strives to realize them.

It is one thing to attribute such powers or influence to values and to real subjects, and quite a different thing to explain how a real existent, subject to the causal determination of the real world, can so effectively pursue non-real ends as to alter the course of the real. Man the real subject who thus pursues ends is as much enmeshed in the chain of events constituting the causal nexus as any other real being. He is "from the start yoked to this texture, outwardly and inwardly. As an ontological being (a natural entity) he is throughout determined."¹ The teleological subject is, as real existent, causally determined, therefore his actions are the consequent effects of antecedent causes.

1. ETH, I, 297.

The causal nexus, by its very nature, cannot be broken, or even temporarily suspended. It must be an unbroken series. How then can man introduce a new determinant, how initiate a series intended to realize ideal ends? This is precisely the problem of the causal antinomy of Kant, the antinomy of necessity and freedom, and although Hartmann thoroughly disagrees with the "methodological drapery" of the Kantian solution, he believes that Kant's treatment of the problem is essentially correct. When stripped of its idealistic trappings it is tremendously significant for the solution of the antinomy.

The essential elements of the Kantian solution are two: "the categorial concept of the causal nexus and the double stratification of the world."² The first of these clearly sets forth the universal and necessary nature of the laws operative in the causal nexus. It was evident, therefore, that no solution of the problem would be forthcoming if freedom were defined in the negative sense as independence of, or freedom from, the determination of causality. Rather must freedom be defined in the positive sense as the operation of an additional determinant, a "determinant which is itself not contained in the causal course of the world."³ Hence, for the subject to pursue his own ends, for finalistic determination to alter the course of real events, the causal

2. ETH, III, 58.

3. ETH, III, 53.

nexus of the real world must be so constructed as to permit the interpolation of a finalistic nexus into it without its being disrupted.

The essential thing here is simply to demonstrate that in the causal nexus there is room for a unique determination which is not causal in its origin. This would not happen at the expense of the causal nexus. The general causal interlacement within the cosmic process must go on uninterrupted.⁴

The only condition under which the entrance of a new, non-causal determinant could be possible would be one in which the subject determined was not only a natural entity, but was also, in some way, participating in a second realm with laws of its own. This is the other important essential of the Kantian solution, the double stratification of the world. Disregarding all the metaphysical definitions used by Kant, the important point is that

there are in general two layers, two orders of conformity, two kinds of determination in the one world, the world in which man exists, and that both manifest themselves in man himself. For if the one layer is entirely determined causally, there is need of a second layer, in order that out of it heterogeneous determinants may be projected into the causal nexus.⁵

For Kant, this second layer was an intelligible world where reason reigned supreme, and man as a rational being felt its determination as the moral law. Although still causally determined, man was positively free because he could add his

4. ETH, III, 55.

5. ETH, III, 58.

own determination to the existing causal determination. Accepting the determination of the moral law in preference to that of the causal nexus, man was self-determined, was free.

The moral law was an imperative, an Ought. Unlike causal determination, it was only a claim upon the subject.

But

the peculiarity of man's moral being is that among the "motives" which inwardly determine him, this claim, purely as such, can weigh very heavily in the scales.⁶

The influence of the Ought upon actual conduct is an empirical ethical fact and even when it is disregarded is still seen as the criterion by which acts are judged. When heeded, this Ought, through the subject, can intervene in and alter the course of real events.

Hartmann does not agree that this intervening determinant proceeds from the real, intelligible world into the phenomenal world through the agency of reason. This is the "methodological drapery" of the Kantian solution to which he objects. According to Hartmann, the Ought originates in the realm of values and enters the real world via the intuitive discernment of the subject. But this difference as regards the nature of moral principles does not prevent his acceptance of the achievements of the Kantian doctrine of freedom as the addition of a new determination in a world causally determined throughout. These achievements are:

6. ETH, III, 60.

first, a demonstration of the fact that there is a power in the moral Ought, which as a heterogeneous, non-causal, determining factor, strikes into the nexus of causal trends, and secondly, a demonstration that the structure of the causal nexus makes such an intervention possible, without any interruption to itself.⁷

Thus Kant's solution of the causal antinomy provides Hartmann with the answer to the problem of how finalistic determination can enter into the causal nexus.

But this solution is not the whole of Kant's contribution to the problem. By his success, he exposed the falsity of other theories regarding freedom. The errors contained in these false theories were all the results of overemphasis on some aspect of the problem.

The most natural of these theories is that which emphasized the causal determination to the extreme. Observing the universality and necessity of the causal nexus, in the physical realm, proponents of this theory concluded that it was operative in the spiritual and mental worlds also. Every act of man, even his resolutions, dispositions, and preferences, were attributed to the action of causal factors. In this theory, no freedom was possible, not even positive freedom. While such a theory might conceivably be true, it fails to account for the experiences of guilt and of choice which are actual ethical phenomena. The individual does feel free, and until this feeling can be satisfactorily accounted for,

7. ETH, III, 60.

the extension of the causal nexus to include all of man's acts will be a highly questionable procedure.

Others, who studied the problem of freedom and were equally impressed by the dominance of causality, were certain that man must be free if he is to be a moral being. Consequently, they sought refuge in a theory of indeterminism. Thus while the causal process was determinant, it contained occasional gaps, in which it was indeterminate. It presented alternatives from which the individual could choose. Once chosen, the causal process took over and controlled the remainder of the action. By such a theory it was hoped that both the fact of causal determination and the phenomenon of freedom could be accounted for.

Still other thinkers were interested and impressed by the experience of purpose in feeling and action. They felt that their conduct was dominated by the ends which they desired. Following the example of the causalists, they reasoned that the same sort of motivation must be the cause of all activity, and extended teleological determinism over all reality. All of reality was moving toward a final end, and this end dictated the means by which the end was to be achieved.

One-sided, monistic theories, such as those of causal or teleological determinism, which would establish one or the other of these determinisms as supreme, destroy the possibility of man's moral freedom.

Both causal and finalistic determination, when

taken in the absolute sense, that is when monistically applied to the whole cosmic structure, commit exactly the same blunder although in the opposite direction. Both reduce the world to uniformity; they give it a type of relational simplicity, which excludes freedom. A universalized causal determinism converts man into a mere natural entity, it degrades him; a universalized finalistic determinism transforms Nature into a being that is directed to ends, into such a being as man is... Both theories reduce everything to a common denominator. They thereby nullify the uniqueness of Moral Being in the world. And again they thereby extinguish man's freedom.⁸

On either of these views, man is nothing more than an instrument by means of which the cosmic process is continued. On the one hand, his conduct is determined by the push of prior events; on the other, it is determined by the pull or attraction of the destined end. In either case man can introduce nothing out of himself which will cause an alteration in the course of events. He is not free to initiate a new series. Such "freedom is only possible where, in one world, at least two types of determination are superimposed one upon the other."⁹ The error of causal and finalistic determinisms is not determinism itself, but deterministic monism, granting of exclusive supremacy to one type of determinism. True freedom is possible only where two or more determinations are operative in the same world.

This fact is the finishing blow for indeterminism. There is no question of a minimum of determination, but of a

8. ETH, III, 75.

9. ETH, III, 64.

maximum. In an undetermined world, freedom would be meaningless for it has meaning only in so far as it gives to its possessor the power to effectively strive to realize his own purposes. Without the uninterrupted operation of the causal nexus, it would not be possible for man to know what to do to realize the ends he has selected from the value realm.

Kant's treatment of the problem of necessity and freedom is thus doubly significant and valuable in that it not only solves the problem, but also exposes the errors of other so-called solutions. It is a coherent solution in which the data of both the physical and moral worlds are merged without being lost. Man is free because of an excess of determination, not a minimum of it. To be positively free, he must be determined on two sides, must be caught in a struggle between the two orders, the causal and the finalistic, for dominance. Only so long as this struggle continues can there be freedom.

Kant described the metaphysical structure necessary for man, or some other such natural entity, to be completely determined causally, yet initiate new, non-causal series of events. The basis of it all is that there must exist "a metaphysical dualism of determinations which runs throughout the cosmic structure and becomes visible in the ethos of man."¹⁰ These requirements are met in Hartmann's theory.

10. ETH, III, 86.

He, too, recognizes the determination of the causal nexus, and with it a second determination superimposed upon the causal nexus and rendered empirically observable only in the moral conduct of man.

Indeed, Hartmann goes on to say that in truth the whole is not a deterministic dualism, but a pluralism. The antinomy between the causal and finalistic nexuses is really not as glaring as it seems at first, for in contrasting the two, several intermediate types of determination are overlooked. The laws or procedures of these intermediate types, such as organic and psychological determination, are still largely unknown. However, enough is known about them to assure their existence. Other determinations, more elemental even than causal determination are known, such as mathematical determination. Probably other determinations, yet unknown, exist above the finalistic, for every stratum of being has its own particular determination.

But it is not necessary to know all of the different determinations to discover the basic law governing the entire determinative structure. This is the twofold law of strength and freedom and holds sway wherever one or more strata are superimposed one upon another. By this law, each stratum of determination is dependent for its very existence upon the whole series of strata beneath it.

There is accordingly no personality, no teleology without consciousness; no consciousness without organic life; no organic life without a causal structure of nature (mechanism in the wide sense);

no causal mechanism without mathematical order; no mathematical entity without the ontologically primal and basic relations.¹¹

Hence, the lower strata are the stronger, the more elemental, the more generally applicable. This dependence of the higher upon the lower strata is irreversible and forbids teleological determinism on a cosmic scale because such cosmic teleology would be an inversion of this basic categorial law.

This dependence of the higher upon the lower strata has a second important aspect. Though the higher stratum cannot be without the lower, it is never determined by it. The lower is only material for the development of the higher. The higher stratum is free to expand and develop its own individual nature, limited only by the limits of the material with which it works, i.e. the lower strata.

It can of course achieve nothing contrary to the lower, but it can achieve everything with it and through it--but this only means that the lower is the stronger.¹²

Despite its inferior strength and material dependence, the higher stratum is autonomous and free.

Then moral freedom, the freedom to pursue ends, is no strange phenomenon but only a special case of the general categorial freedom which appears from stratum to stratum. The lower freedoms are no less significant, but man stresses this particular freedom because it is the only basis of his

11. ETH, III, 92.

12. ETH, III, 94.

ethical being.

Hartmann has much more to say on the problem of teleology and freedom. It is evident from the detailed treatment which he gives this problem, that he considers it the crucial point of the entire sphere. While it would be interesting to follow his treatment of the problem further, and the temptation to do so is strong, it is necessary for the purposes of the present study to return to matters more closely related to Hartmann's theory of value. Those who wish to learn more of Hartmann's doctrine of freedom and his treatment of teleology, both human and cosmic, will find an excellent study of these matters in a thesis by Richard Millard, Jr., written for Boston University in 1942.¹³

The purpose of this section was to determine how the finalistic nexus could be introduced into the causal nexus in such a way as to enable a real existent, man, to strive for his own ends. It was Kant's contribution to show that such freedom was possible given a second, non-causal determination (like the finalistic determination) in addition to, but not contrary to, the primal determination. Hartmann's analysis of the relations of categorial strata shows that freedom of the higher, superimposed strata from the determination of the lower strata is a normal characteristic of the categorial structure. While the finalistic nexus is dependent upon the

13. Millard, TNHE.

technical being.

Hartmann has much more to say on the problem of rationality and freedom. It is evident from the detailed treatment which he gives this problem, that he considers it the central point of the entire sphere. While it would be interesting to follow his treatment of the problem further, and the temptation to do so is strong, it is necessary for the purposes of the present study to return to matters more closely related to Hartmann's theory of value. Those who wish to learn more of Hartmann's doctrine of freedom and his treatment of rationality, both human and cosmic, will find an excellent study of these matters in a thesis by Richard Willard, Jr., written for Boston University in 1942.¹²

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causal, and cannot exceed its limits, it is freed from its determination in accordance with the basic categorial law of strength and freedom. Thus it is ontologically possible for values, established as ends by the subject, to become determinant in the real world despite the universality and necessity of the causal nexus.

2. The Ought-to-Be and Value Realization

In the previous chapter, it was seen that an ideal Ought-to-Be attaches to the ideal essence of every value. This ideal Ought-to-Be approves or condemns real existence in accord with the degree to which values are or are not realized in it. This judgment is detached from reality, is purely ideal. But when reality is contradictory to ideality, the ideal Ought-to-Be issues forth from the ideal realm and extends itself to the real as a positive Ought-to-Be.

In itself the real sphere does not oppose or favor the realization of values. The real sphere, the causal nexus, and the other lower strata of determination, are material for the higher, finalistic determination. For its part, reality is passive and indifferent as regards value realization. It is as independent of values as values, in their self-existence, are of reality.

Since values are not actively opposed by the determination of real categories, it would seem that they would experience no difficulty in becoming realized. But values,

for all their tendency toward realization, and their freedom to enter into the course of the real, have no power over it. It is one of the limitations of their ideality that they can only enter into and affect the real world as they are discerned and desired by a real existent entity.

The positive Ought-to-Be is the expression of the tendency of the unrealized values to become realized, and occupies a position midway between the ideal and real spheres. It is a product of the tension between the two spheres. Beyond this point values are powerless to penetrate until they are discerned by some real subject.

In the stream of real existence in fluctuating reality itself, there must be a point of support, upon which the Ought-to-Be impinges. There must be a something or other within the real course of the world which is added to the world as a member of it and is dependent upon its universal conditions: it must come under the laws of the real world, share completely in the world's existential mode of coming into being and vanishing, it must be a thing that passes away like the world's other forms. And yet it must at the same time be able to be a carrier of the imperishable, the ideal; it must in this one connection be more than the other forms, distinguished from all other reality by an essential feature, able to act in a manner different from the rest of the real world. In short, there must be a form capable of intent in the midst of blind events, itself brought forth and borne along by them and yet, amidst them, powerful in self-activity.¹⁴

For the positive Ought-to-Be to become a real determinant, there must exist a real subject with two qualifications; sensitivity to the Ought-to-Be of values, and ability to di-

14. ETH, I, 256.

rect and control real events. It must be a real existent wholly under the laws of actuality like the other existents, yet at the same time differing from them by virtue of its consciousness of another world, the ideal realm of values.

The only real subject which is known to possess these qualifications is man. He is capable of purposive self-activity, and is responsive to the call of the ideal. While participating in the real world, he is able to reflect within himself another world, the world of ideal essences. When the real world in which he participates contradicts the ideal world of which he is made conscious by his feeling of value, then the positive Ought-to-Be enters into reality. It seizes upon him and proclaims the unrealized values of Being. It is still powerless to determine anything in reality. The Ought can become a real determinant only as it wins the support of the subject for its own aims. Through the activity of this alien being, the Ought may overcome the resistance of the real and the values to which it attaches be realized.

When the positive Ought-to-Be, by means of its discernment by the subject, enters the consciousness of a real entity, it becomes a value-concept. It exists in the consciousness of the subject as knowledge of something which Ought-to-Be. This part of the a priori discernment of values is not exemplified in the phenomenon of conscience. At this stage no guilt or personal obligation attaches to the value dis-

cerned. The subject has merely recognized the non-existence of the discerned value and the desirability or "valuableness" of such a value if it did exist. Thus, when the concept of universal peace enters the subject's consciousness, it may appear eminently desirable and yet so far beyond any seeming possibility of being realized as to negate any active response the subject might be moved to make. Mere recognition that a value Ought-to-Be does not constitute an imperative Ought-to-Do.

A place for that is not possible until someone is in need of the goods and someone can acquire them by effort...I ought to do what ought to be, in so far as it "is" not, and in so far as to make it actual is in my power.¹⁵

The Ought-to-Be which is beyond the subject's powers then does not obligate him in anyway. He chooses his ends in accordance with his need and ability.

Value realization is not only limited by the subject's ability to discern them but are further limited by the power of the subject's will to refuse to acknowledge the Ought. There is no compulsion in it. When it becomes possible for the subject to do something about peace, he may deny the obligation of the Ought-to-Be which it is in his power to cause to Be.

Thus it is evident that "the attitude of the subject to the Ought is the central point in the ethical problem."¹⁶

15. ETH, I, 248.

16. ETH, I, 261.

The entire process of value realization is dependent upon it. Without the co-operative, purposive activity of the subject in their behalf, values must remain unrealized. Since the subject's striving is the result of the attractive power of values presented through the primal feeling of value, all such practical intent and activity, all realization of values, is dependent upon the self-existence of the values. But for them to be realized, for the journey from ideality to reality to be completed, a real subject must affirm them in contrast to what "is" and, having done so, must strive to make them real.

Through such affirmation and striving finalistic determination enters into the real world. When the subject discerns a value which Ought-to-Be and which needs to be and possibly can be realized in his world, he sets this up as an end. As a desired goal, it is at the same time

power and a directional point. As something substantial it does not impel the process from behind and push it forward, but draws it to itself.¹⁷

In this sense, the finalistic nexus is the reverse of the causal. In the causal process, the later occurrences are always determined by the earlier, while in the finalistic process, the end, the later occurrence determines the earlier occurrences which make it possible. While

the dynamic of the causal series is that of a blind forward push...the dynamic of the final-

17. ETH, I, 273.

istic series is the attraction issuing from the final end. The prior existence of the end is the condition of the whole.¹⁸

This prior existence of the end is not to be taken as identical with the ideal self-existence of all values. Once the values have been discerned, all subsequent activity, the selection as ends and the striving to make real, is wholly within the real structure.

The end can only exist, prior to its realization, as an anticipated result of the subject's activity. When the subject sets up the end in his consciousness, he thus transcends time. In his consciousness, he escapes the limitations of time and dwells momentarily in the future. Then, beginning at the end, step by step, he determines what the antecedent step must be, tracing the course of the end realization back to the present. Arriving at the present, the subject reverses the procedure, and the antecedent steps are fitted into the causal nexus as means to the end. If the setting up of the end be included, the finalistic nexus is seen to be a threefold process. The steps are:

1. The setting up of the end by the subject, an overleaping of the time-process, an anticipation only possible to consciousness and a taking of one's stand regardless of the order of time.
2. The return determination (distinctive of the finalistic process) of the means by the end, beginning with the means nearest to the end and so backward to the first means--the present one--which is close to the subject...
3. The actualization of the end, its real attain-

18. ETH, I, 275.

ment through the series of means, wherein the relation of means and end which was reversed in the backward process is changed into a straightforward continuous relation of cause and effect.¹⁹

From this analysis of the finalistic nexus it is evident that the causal nexus is presupposed in it.

Although only the third and last step of the finalistic nexus is in accord with the processes of the causal nexus, the success of the entire venture depends upon it. The previous step, the tracing of the antecedent means from end to beginning, can only be useful if the effect of each of these antecedents can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy, and such prediction is possible only in a causally determined world.

The intervention of any entity which pursues ends in the world in which it exists is only possible in a world causally determined...In a world without law and determinism, where everything was by chance, an agent who pursued ends could not hold his own at all.²⁰

This is a reiteration of the basic categorial law. The lower causal determination is a prerequisite for the successful effective operation of the higher, finalistic determination. The finalistic nexus must always be woven into the existing causal nexus. For this reason it is no cause for despair to learn that man, as an ontological being, is thoroughly determined. It is only by his participation in the causal nexus that the Ought becomes an Is, that values are realized and

19. ETH, I, 276.

20. ETH, I, 277.

become determinant in the real world.

3. Value Realization and Personality

Values are dependent upon the subject for becoming principles of the real. Unless such a real entity discerns them and commits itself to making them effective in its world, they must remain unrealized and merely potential real principles. There is another aspect to this relationship, however. The subject is equally dependent upon the mediating relationship if it is to attain cosmic significance and realize its own potential.

Ontologically regarded, "man in comparison with the whole is a speck of dust, an ephemeral, a negligible phenomenon."²¹ If ontological determination were the only force operative, man would remain cosmically insignificant. But, by his active commitment to values, man proclaims the presence of another cosmic force, axiological or finalistic determination. This determination receives its dynamic from the attraction of values and moves discerning subjects to purposive activity in behalf of the possible real embodiment of the values discerned. This activity interposes itself in the ontological process, using its indifferent might to attain value-determined ends. As the means by which the ontological and axiological determinations are integrated, man

21. ETH, I, 243.

thus acquires stature in the cosmos,

in this his insignificance is overborne...Man, a vanishing point in the universe, is still in his own way stronger than it: he is the vehicle of a higher principle, he is the creator of a reality which possesses significance and value, he transmits to the real world a higher worth.²²

In his role as agent for a higher principle, the presence of which in the real world is significant, man, too, is significant.

Seen here, in true perspective, man is neither the center nor the end of the universe. His true place and value is found in his unique ability to discern values and strive for their realization.

It gives him a dignity of a peculiar kind--personality--which is as much a categorial novelty as it is a valuational mark. A moral subject who of all real entities stands alone en rapport with the ideal world of values and who alone has the metaphysical tendency to communicate them to reality which lacks them--only such a subject is a person.²³

Man's relation to the value realm thus gives him cosmic stature and enables him to realize his potentiality as a subject, and become a person.

According to Hartmann, there are two decisive elements of ethical personality. Though these elements grow out of the subject-value relationship, they are not the result of the subject's discernment of values nor of his activity in their behalf. "One is this: that the values do not coerce

22. ETH, I, 243.

23. ETH, I, 266.

the subject, but even when they are discerned, impose only a claim upon him, while leaving him free."²⁴ The fact that it is in his power to accept or reject the obligation attaching to values he has discerned, that he can say "no" to great metaphysical powers gives the subject a kind of equality with them. Because of this volitional freedom, he is an independent factor in the cosmic process, an unpredictable factor that must be reckoned with in determining the ultimate consequences of the process.

"The second element of personality is found in the valuational marks which the subject retains in his acts."²⁵ These marks are not the same as the ends for which the subject acts, but are by-products of such activity, inhering in the subject himself rather than in the end. These marks of ethical personality, developed in the subject as a result of his disposition, will, and action, to bring about the realization of values, are moral values. Their development, structure, and place in the system of values will be the subject of a later chapter. It is sufficient for the present to recognize that they develop out of the subject-value relationship.

However different these values may be from those which constitute the matter of the will and the content of the ends, they stand in the closest relation with them; for exactly that conduct has moral value which is a commitment of the person to

24. ETH, I, 266.

25. ETH, I, 266-267.

ends directed and selected by the moral feeling
for values.²⁶

In his rejection or acceptance of values, and in the quality of his efforts to realize them, the subject is a carrier of value and disvalue, of good and evil, of moral value.

Thus the two elements of personality are closely inter-related with each other and with the realization of value. In these relations is seen the real significance of the ideal subsistence of values for man. "Only through the intrusion of values as determining powers into his actional sphere does the subject become that which he morally is, a person."²⁷ He is one real existent among many in the realm of Being, ontologically determined. If the values which he serves were mere "inventions", entirely subjective, then it would be as if he sought to free himself by pulling on his own bootstraps. If these values were derived from experience in and of the ontological realm, then they would be existential laws as binding as those of the causal nexus, leaving the subject no freedom. But by hearing and heeding the "call of the ideal", by discerning values and striving to make them real in his own world, man is freed from determination by that world. Declaring his allegiance to the value realm, while retaining his real residence, he becomes a person.

This participation in two worlds is the condition of

26. ETH, I, 267.

27. ETH, I, 268.

personality, as well as of freedom. The person is

an ontological and an axiological entity, a real self-existing being, and at the same time possessing in himself the higher, the distinctively moral values or their opposites...This is the reason why man's moral nature, his personality, can never be determined simply from the ontological nature, but is axiological as well.²⁸

Man is a real being with a knowledge of and participation in non-real, ideal principles. Working with and for values, man sees his axiological nature, his

morally super-empirical essence, his inner determination, his Idea, to be his own proper self. In accordance with it, he tries to live, that is to form his empirical being.²⁹

This inner determination, superimposed upon causal determination, in accordance with the basic categorial law, gives man moral autonomy and he becomes his own proper self, a personality. Thus values, while using man for their own realization, are in turn the means to man's self-realization.

28. ETH, I, 269-270.

29. ETH, I, 199.

CHAPTER III

MORAL VALUES

1. General Aspects of Moral Values

As the discussion turns from the consideration of the nature of the value realm and value realization to the study of a special group of values, the moral, it is immediately evident that not all values involved in the moral phenomena are moral values. Man as a moral being, is related to and a product of a multitude of non-moral values. While "moral conduct is always conduct toward persons,"¹ it is always in connection with other kinds of values. For this reason, everything which is, is also from the standpoint of ethics, either a value or a disvalue. As it affects the development or lack of development of desirable moral qualities, everything thereby acquires a valuational mark.

The relation of moral to non-moral values is similar in many ways to the relation of the various categories. In studying that relationship, it was seen that the lower, stronger, more universal categories were material for the development of higher categories which, while in a sense dependent upon the lower, were free or autonomous as regards them. Moral values also are dependent upon the lower, non-moral values. Honesty has a moral value only because there

1. ETH, II, 24.

are things which can be stolen. Charity is valuable because it gives something to someone in need. In neither case, however is the moral worth of the act measured by the material value of the non-moral good to which it is related. Nevertheless, moral value "presupposes the value of goods not in themselves moral, and without them it could not itself exist."² This dependence of the moral upon the non-moral values is simply a material dependence and does not affect the autonomy of the moral values. Thus while biological or organic values are prerequisites for the attainment of spiritual or moral values, they do not limit or determine the quality of the values attained. It is possible for an individual with a diseased or malformed body to attain great strength of moral character.

Indeed, this may be carried even farther. All levels of value, both higher and lower, possess this autonomy. Each value is intrinsically "valuable", regardless of its relation to other values. This is particularly evident on the level of the spiritual values where the beautiful, the noble, the lovable, are valuable for their own sake. But the values of life, of consciousness, of health, are equally valuable for their own sake. While all values acquire new significance as they are used as material for the higher values, this fact must not be expanded into an axiological monism with

2. ETH, II, 25.

the higher values determining the worth of the lower values. The higher values cannot exist or be attained without the existence of the lower, but the lower values are not merely means, they are ends in themselves.

This relation of dependence and autonomy is more clearly understood when it is seen that moral values are never directly striven for, but are always by-products of the striving. The end of loving is not to be loving, but to bestow love upon the one loved. The end of true charity is not to be charitable, but to help one in need.

The end of an act is a situational value; its moral quality, on the contrary, is an actional and thereby a personal value. Moral qualities characterize a person's conduct, but not the object of the intention in which his conduct subsists. According to Scheler's phrase, they appear "on the back of the deed", but not in the goal it aims at.³

Moral values are dependent upon situational values which are the objects of personal action. But the moral worth of the action itself is not determined by the worth of the end of the action. Moral values are not the ends of action, but qualities of the action itself.

From this it would seem reasonable to assume that moral values could not be determinant factors in personal conduct. This assumption would be greatly in error, however, for conscience, that voice of the ideal value realm, is not solely an after-effect of conduct, but also aids in the selection

3. ETH, II, 31.

of ends. Guided by the Idea of what the self ought to be, the conscience passes judgment upon proposed ends, condemning those which call for action not in accord with the Idea.

Although moral worth is a quality of the striving to realize ends, it is not strictly correct to say that moral values cannot be striven for. One may strive to attain moral worth in one's own personality. The activities of churches and schools offer ample proof of this kind of endeavor. But

even where the end of the endeavour is really the moral worth of a personality (one's own or another's), it is never the same as the moral worth of the endeavor.⁴

When the educator attempts to develop honesty or self-denial in the student, his acts are not on that account to be called either honest or self-denying. The moral worth of such acts, while valuable in itself, is something other than that which is aimed at. Thus it is necessary to include personal values in with situational or goods values as possible objects of striving. But the moral values realized in the striving subject will be qualities of his striving, not the ends striven for.

The nature of man's moral worth is such that it receives its richest development when he gives it the least attention, and directs his attention and activities outward. In losing himself in the service of others, man finds his true

4. ETH, II, 36.

self and attains moral worth. Since moral values do not inhere in ends, but are realized in the acts intended to realize the ends, two important facts stand out. First, moral values may be realized in the subject which were not intended or striven for, and secondly, the moral worth of an act, while a quality of the striving, does not depend upon the successful attainment of the intended end.

This is not to imply that there is no limit to the realization of moral values.

There are goods which one may indeed lose when one has them, but cannot gain when one has never had them, or has lost them. Of this kind are youth, ingenuousness, harmlessness, and closely related to those are certain forms of happiness, such as a cheerful disposition, healthy light-heartedness, also--up to a point--beauty, charm, natural grace, and many related things.⁵

While these gifts may be cultivated and developed to a certain extent, in the case of the first-mentioned examples even this possibility does not exist.

A further limitation upon the moral values attainable lies in the physical and psychological structure of the subject.

Thus for the coward by nature courage is utterly unattainable; in its place a substitute can at best be installed through reflection, self-control and habit, a kind of inner discipline.⁶

The same limit applies here as in the case of the Ought-to-Do. Nothing can be done by, or expected of, the subject

5. ETH, II, 42.

6. ETH, II, 43.

which he is powerless to do.

2. Problems of Gradation, System, and Unity

In speaking of moral and non-moral values, and higher and lower values, a gradation of values has been presupposed. It is not possible to make any permanent classification of values on the basis of the meager knowledge possessed at this stage of the investigation. On the other hand, some knowledge of the relationship of one value to another is necessary if one is to make even the most elementary decisions. In every ethical situation a multitude of values clamor for attention and realization. Since not all can be heeded, the subject is forced to choose which value or values he will heed. In this choosing, the subject is guided by his consciousness of the ethical situation, setting value against value. He is aided by the fact that with the primal sensing of values is given also a feeling of their relative rank or grade.

Socrates was the first to realize the importance of knowing what was good. His teaching that man will do the good when he knows it was based on a keen insight into human nature. Hartmann puts it thus, "It is in the nature of human volition that it never is directed towards anything contrary to value as such."⁷ All striving is toward something which

7. ETH, II, 46.

is good, or is conceived to be good. Evil or disvalue results from a mistaken striving for the lower value when it was possible to have striven for a higher one. Man does not choose evil or lower values because he prefers them, but because he is confused by the clamor of the lower values which drowns out the whisper of the higher.

Even though the primal consciousness of values is at the same time a consciousness of valuational grade, and even if the subject were always to select the higher value, the conflict of values would not be ended. The vastness of the value manifold and the apparently equal worth of values qualitatively different gives strong indication of a multi-dimensional gradation of values rather than a simple linear arrangement. Then if values of equal rank were in conflict, the primal consciousness of grade could not resolve the conflict.

Still, despite this limitation, the sense of value and its accompanying sense of grade offers the most promising means of access to a knowledge of the gradation prevailing in the realm of values. Many attempts have been made to establish criteria for determining valuational grade, but these have for the most part been only general outlines, making distinctions in grade which are practically self-evident. The finer differences of grade are not made clear in this way, and it is just these fine discriminations which are needed.

While the knowledge of the scale of values given by the sense of grade is far from complete, the presentation of such a primal intuitive discernment of relative height

proves that there is a fixed, pervading gradation of rank, which is inseparable from the essence of values and has the same mode of existence as they, the same ideal self-existence.⁸

This fixed, objective gradation of values is unalterable by man, even though he may mistakenly attempt to alter it by imposing his own standard upon it.

The sense of grade, though proof of a definite fixed gradation of values, cannot be used as a criterion to measure and test the values competing in every ethical situation. It only expresses itself as an elementary feeling of preference in particular instances, and is detected only by the attentive and patient. But through development and use of it, fragmentary as its revelations may be, much can be learned of the ideal scale of values.

It is the task of ethics to assemble, analyze, and interpret the phenomena of the valuational consciousness. It must take the data of moralities past and present and extract from them the truth which each of them possesses. Then all of these insights into the value realm, contradictory or not, must somehow be fitted into a system of values. All the phenomena must be admitted. No false harmony is to be achieved at the sacrifice of inclusiveness. While harmony is

8. ETH, II, 60.

of course desirable, contradictory or antinomic phenomena are not to be omitted merely because they do not harmonize.

To find a supreme value which was the focal unity of all values has been the goal of ethicists ever since Plato. This unending search for a supreme value has discovered two possibilities. The supreme value

could lie in the direction of the simplest and most elementary values, and indeed be capable of being exhibited beyond the last; but it could also lie in the opposite direction, in that of the most complex and concrete, and be recognizable beyond these. In the first case, by the supreme value is meant the strongest and most elementary (also the most general), but in the second, the axiologically highest.⁹

Ethical theories which seek the supreme value in the universal desires of men such as pleasure, happiness, self-preservation, are examples of the first type. Other theories which place love of God, or justice, or personality at the apex of the axiological structure exemplify the latter.

There is a certain justification for both views. Indeed it is entirely possible that both could exist as the polar extremes of the value realm. But ethics must leave this problem unanswered until the phenomena of the valuational consciousness yields a great deal more information about this realm. Pending further knowledge of the value realm and the ultimate disclosure of its systematic structure, the multiplicity of observable values must be joined

9. ETH, II, 69.

together in some kind of system. Any system or scale of values based upon the fragmentary valuational knowledge now possessed will in all probability be a temporary and unsatisfactory stop-gap. But because of the ever-present demand for making moral decisions, some scale of values, even though it is not the ideal, absolute scale, is needed.

Any system of values which may be constructed will have as its goal the ultimate harmony of all values and the supremacy of one group or type of values. But this desire for harmony and a monism of values must not be allowed to influence the investigation of ethical phenomena. The phenomena must determine the system, not the system the phenomena.

Our view of them must be based upon their relations to one another: the relations of subsumption and foundation, of kinship and discrepancy, of structure and content, of height and interpenetration of the spheres of validity. It must allow for oppositions and conflicts as well as harmonies--at the risk of coming upon valuational antinomies which for the sense of value remain insoluble.¹⁰

Only a system which thus includes all of the phenomena can be a valid system. Its validity will rest upon the inclusion of antinomies as well as harmonies.

Probably the most commonly observed or experienced of these valuational antinomies is the conflict of value with value. This conflict arises when values in a given situation are so nearly equal in grade that the primal sense of valuational grade can make no distinction between them. If the

10. ETH, II, 71.

nature of the actional sphere is such that both values cannot be selected, then an antinomy results which is only resolved by the determination of the subject.

In practice, then the values clash. For instance, whoever places personal regard above law, gives preference to love and violates justice, although in themselves justice and love do not exclude each other.¹¹

While this conflict may not exist in the ideal value realm, it does exist for the subject because of volitional limitations, and constitutes not only a problem for the subject, but also is further proof of the multi-dimensional structure of the value realm. Since the only basis for gradation which Hartmann admits as valid is the preferential sense of grade, and it is powerless to decide the conflict of value with value, such conflict must be considered insoluble and included as such in the system of values.

Two antinomies which are of tremendous importance for the subject are found in the relationship of values to reality. The ideal values are values which of necessity Ought-to-Be. But when they seek to enter reality, they are opposed by the freedom of the subject. This freedom of the subject as regards the Ought is of value for it plays an important part in the transformation of the subject into a person. The ideal values are also, if realized, of value. In this antinomy, if the subject chooses one or the other of the

11. ETH, II, 77.

elements, freedom or commitment, to the exclusion of the other, he destroys his personality. He must balance the two elements if he would retain both his freedom and the values which become his as a carrier of values.

Closely related to this antinomy is the antinomy of unrealized and realized values. Realized values are of value, therefore the realization of values is also a value. But if all values were realized, there would be no unrealized values which could serve as ends of striving. Thus the value of realized values opposes the motivational value of unrealized values in an irreducible conflict.

This antinomic relationship of opposites is also expressed in a variety of contrasts which Hartmann calls "relational opposites". These contrasts do not require a positive choice for one or the other of their elements as in the case with the true antinomies, but, on the contrary, are more satisfactorily treated by merging the opposite elements into a synthesis. Thus the tendency of the subject to dissipate his energies in constant activity is opposed by a tendency to self-preservation and inertia. Both tendencies are valuable, for without activity, values could never become realized, but without a subject that endures through its activities, there would be nothing to act, nor anything for moral values to inhere in. All motion rises upon stability. Without it there is no motion. Thus both the striving and the striver are valuable elements which can and must be

retained.

Similar opposed correlatives are harmony and conflict, grade and range. The value of the tendency to harmonize and absorb all conflict is opposed by the value of the growth which takes place where conflict continually stirs things up. The value of stress upon the development of one value or group of values is opposed to the value of developing a wide range and variety of values, of participating in the rich value manifold offered by life. In all of these oppositions or contrasts, the valuableness of both elements is incontestable. Equally incontestable also, is the fact that they are opposites and the further development of either in the same subject, to that extent excludes the other. Though not insoluble antinomies, these relational opposites indicate further complications and increased complexity for the developing system of values.

Hartmann's great genius for analysis is evident in almost every phase of his phenomenological study of ethics, but in the analysis of the oppositional relationship of the individual and the group or community, this genius is perhaps most evident. The collective unity of individuals, the group, community, state, or nation, is the enduring bearer of values. It is the permanent element,

the substance, in which alone distant goals, far-seeing human enterprises, can be pursued. And in so far as the individual can co-operate in these enterprises, when at times he consciously enters into their service...he subordinates himself and his private ends to the enterprises, he recognizes their su-

periority and consciously converts himself into a means; in some cases he sacrifices his personal existence for them. He adjusts his life as a member organically to some grand process which passes beyond him into the future, into the life of the communal being in which he participates only by contributing, not by receiving.¹²

By this self-sacrifice, the individual clearly expresses his recognition of the value of the on-going community. From this recognition of the value of the community, it is no great leap to the idea that the state or community is the important, the valuable thing and that individuals are of value only through their contribution to the collective unit.

Over against this extreme of collectivism, is seen the opposite extreme of individualism. While it is recognized that the individual must express himself in and through the community, it must be kept in mind that the value of the collective unit is a borrowed value. Every act of the unit is an individual act, and the individual can only commit himself to the will of the community when its ends are ends which he himself values. Without the individual there would be no community.

The culminating point of this individualism is that the individual just as unscrupulously credits himself with the worth and claim of the existing community, as the community credits itself with the worth and claim of the individual...He rejects the collective unit which is of no use, opposes it, overthrows it. For him the community is only a means to his own life and his own ends.¹³

12. ETH, II, 107.

13. ETH, II, 112.

Human greatness and progress is always an individual affair. It is the individual who must develop new values, new understanding which can then spread to the rest of the community. It is from the value of the individual that the community derives its value.

It is evident that both socialism and individualism suffer from the tyrannical tendency of all "isms" and seek to establish their own particular view or value as supreme. However, it is important to recognize the truth contained in each of the extremes.

In communal ethics the error lies on the surface. The collective unit itself, taken by itself, exists only in abstraction. Apart from individuals it has no being.¹⁴ It exists only in them, for it consists of them.

Therefore the whole must respect the worth and being of the part, for without the part, the whole ceases to be. An additional, axiological significance is given to the individual because as a person, he alone can be a carrier of moral values. Thus the part is of a higher order, axiologically speaking, than the whole.

But individualism is an equally false abstraction for the individual is never found completely isolated from society. He is a product of his interrelations, of the cultural and ethical society into which he is born and in which he participates. He has no self-existence apart from the whole.

14. ETH, II, 113.

Here, as in previous antinomies, the solution is no solution, but a compromise. The individual must acknowledge the value peculiar to the collective unit as a bearer of the mores of individuals past and present, while the collective unit must realize that its value is a derived value and attaches to it only so long as it serves the ultimate end, the individuals past, present, and future, who compose it.

So much for the oppositions and conflicts which complicate both the construction of a system of values and moral conduct. Hartmann has shown by his analysis of these conflicts that each of the conflicting elements is a value, and must therefore be given due consideration in any valid system of values. Since such a system must be based upon the relations of values to one another, Hartmann's next step is to analyse these relations more closely.

3. Values Which Condition Contents

The values which condition contents are the qualities possessed by man as a real subject and by reality as object, which enable the former to act to realize ends, and the latter to provide the stage and properties necessary to the action. Strictly speaking, these values are not moral values, but conditional values. They constitute the means by which man may become a moral being, but on the higher levels they are almost indistinguishable from moral values themselves.

It may be said that in the whole series goods and situations are predominant among the categorially lower materials, but that they diminish toward the higher, while conversely the moral values increase in the same relation and finally attain complete predominance.¹⁵

In this trend the transitional nature of these values is clearly revealed, beginning with the value of mere existence and rising to the value of man's unique capacity for purposive activity which is the key to his attainment of moral values.

Since the first requirement of a bearer of values is to be a real subject, life, as the basis of real subjectivity, is the most elementary value for man, the axiological being. Life, for him, is the basic condition of all higher moral and spiritual development.

In this sense, vitality, vital strength, the degree of life in man, is a value proper. It is the value of that side of his being by which he is deeply rooted in nature and is himself a natural entity... the root which sustains spiritual life until it reaches its highest elevation.¹⁶

Without life there is no setting up of ends, no striving to realize them, and hence no moral value. Consequently, death and all other things which weaken or destroy this ontological root are disvalues in the degree to which they lessen the subject's attainment of moral values. Since death marks the cessation of all value realization, it is the extreme of disvalue, but mental and physical maladjustments also consti-

15. ETH, II, 127.

16. ETH, II, 131.

tute a serious threat to the subject's axiological activities. Given the care and respect due it as the basis of all higher values, life can be directed to higher and nobler ends. Then life, as a natural value conditioning the attainment of moral values by a subject, becomes itself a moral value.

Possessing life, man is one with all living things. But he is more than, different from mere living things, and his distinction begins with consciousness. By means of it, he becomes aware of himself and others. Consciousness, as used here, is more than simply knowledge by understanding; it includes intuition and other forms of experience by means of which man's knowledge of himself and others is increased or affected. Indeed, the upper level of consciousness, the awareness of values, is just such an intuitive discernment of content not perceived by the understanding. With this intuitive sense of values, man is conscious not only of things and situations as existing, but also as valuable.

All circumstances which confront him, all situations into which he falls, come under his judgments as to value and thereby attain for him sense, meaning, importance.¹⁷

Thus, everything presented to man's consciousness acquires a valuational mark. But whatever he remains unconscious of does not exist for him either ontologically or axiologically.

Since his moral being is a by-product of his conscious,

17. ETH, II, 136.

purposive striving to realize values which are absent from real situations, the range of values which he can realize and the moral values which he may acquire are limited by the extent of his conscious awareness of and participation in real situations. Consequently the worth of consciousness as a basis for moral value rises in the scale of value as it is developed and the subject's field of conscious participation enlarged.

Life and consciousness form the ontological foundation upon which man builds his moral being, his personality. It was seen previously¹⁸ that Hartmann considers man's freedom from valuational compulsion together with the moral values inhering in him as an agent of values to be the decisive elements of personality. But further analysis reveals the presence of other factors, qualities of the subject, which must be used and developed if he is to become a moral being.

The most prominent of these factors of moral being is activity. This, however, is

not the restlessness of tendency in general...but commitment, the living mobility of the ethos in seizing the initiative and giving one's adherence, even where it does not issue in overt action.¹⁹

This commitment of the subject is of value because it is only through such activity by a real subject that values become realized. But it is also of direct, personal value to

18. See Chapter II, section 3, above.

19. ETH, II, 137.

the subject since moral value inheres in acts rather than ends. Through intention and activity man develops his moral being.

In contrast to activity as a value, passivity stands as the extreme disvalue. In this relationship, passivity is not mere inert persistence, but is ethical and valuational indifference, stagnation, a disinterested disregard on the part of the subject which deadens the sense of value by its lack of response.

Besides passivity, another opposite, suffering, stands in apparent contrast to activity, but not as a disvalue. There is a special value in suffering, for when one has done all one can do, when further activity is useless or impossible, then in such circumstances

where nothing apparently remains but to submit passively, a deeper power of the moral nature in place of ordinary activity is released, a power which at other times is closed but which now, having been freed, takes up the struggle for moral existence.²⁰

This new power which appears in the capacity to suffer, to endure, is hidden deep within man's spirit, and it can only reveal itself when nothing else avails. By means of it man can bear suffering, can remain unbeaten despite grief or misfortune. He finds new riches, new depths in his spirit. He becomes conscious of values which before were hidden from him, and his capacity for happiness and value realization is

20. ETH, II, 139.

augmented through this increased awareness of the manifold values in the situations which confront him.

There is a limit to the value of suffering, beyond which it becomes an extreme disvalue. The point at which this transformation occurs is not determined by the suffering itself, but by the subject's capacity to bear it. But within the limit of the subject's endurance, and increasingly so as it approaches this limit, suffering is of value because of the opportunity which it affords his spiritual powers to ascend from the innermost depths of his being and reveal themselves. It is not to be desired, but is embraced and turned to advantage when it does come.

But the new spiritual powers revealed in the courageous endurance of suffering do not exhaust its possibilities for value realization, for the higher moral values, if not the highest, are realized in the subject's voluntary commitment to and striving for ends which by their very nature involve great trials, responsibilities, and personal sacrifice.

The moral value of an action, and of commitment to ends in the face of possible suffering, increases "with the degree of commitment to it; and it attains its highest point when the whole personality without reserve is surrendered to the thing striven for."²¹ The value of activity and of suffering is determined by the strength of will or determination

21. ETH, II, 143.

which stands behind the intention implied or expressed in them and furnishes them with persevering, striving power. Without regard for the worth of the intended end, the strength of the intention is itself a moral value, which reaches its height in the willingness to sacrifice one's self in one's acts.

The recognition that the degree of commitment to ends may vary indicates the existence of a further quality of the subject which conditions his attainment of moral being. This further condition of personality is freedom of will and of action. Freedom of the will is seen in the fact that the subject chooses the values to which he will commit himself, and he determines the degree of commitment, while freedom of action is evident in his ability to strive to realize values to which his will has committed him. The possibility of the reality of such freedom was discussed previously²² and it was seen then that it was this self-determination of ends and action by the subject which enabled him to free himself from ontological determination and rise to personality as a moral being.

With this freedom of will and action comes the responsibility for its consequences. The importance of freedom to man is nowhere more clearly evident than in his willing acceptance of responsibility and even guilt for his own con-

22. See Chapter II, section 1, above.

duct. Guilt, like suffering is not to be desired, but when it comes it must be borne, for "it signifies for him the retention of his personality, the preservation and recognition of his freedom."²³ It is a mark of his unique gift, a symbol of his moral self-hood. In bearing his guilt willingly, he tells the world that he is a free being. If he weakens and longs, mistakenly, for deliverance from his guilt, he proves himself unable to bear his freedom. Ethics knows of no deliverance from guilt, but finds cause for rejoicing in the knowledge and triumphant bearing of it.

Man, even with the qualities of consciousness, activity, strength, and freedom would still be unable to realize values if he did not also possess foresight. The past and the present are unalterably determined. Only the future offers any possibility for teleological intervention. By his ability to anticipate, to foresee, man discovers his only possible field of action, the future. Foreseeing the ends of his striving, he is able to determine the steps necessary to their realization. Guided thus, he is free to commit his will and activity to the realization of the future ends.

The final factor of personality found in the subject is thus his conscious commitment to foreseen but unrealized ends, his teleology. In the setting up of ends, the predetermination of means, and the guidance of the real process of events

23. ETH, II, 145.

toward these desired ends, the value of this teleology is plainly evident. By means of it he fulfills his role of mediator between the value realm and reality, and "becomes thereby the bearer of moral values. For it is to acts distinguished by such teleology that the qualities good and bad pertain."²⁴ Thus teleology is man's greatest gift, and also the most dangerous. Like suffering, it is of value only within the limits of the subject's endurance. Many are broken by the responsibility and the guilt which is theirs by virtue of this power. But man must continue the dangerous game, for it is his only means to personality and cosmic significance. By use of the teleological power which is his and the proper care of the factors which condition it, he can attain moral being.

The value of the above mentioned qualities of the subject is generally realized in the striving for situational values, or goods. These values differ from the personal, actional values just discussed in that they do not attach to a subject, but give scope and direction to the subject's striving. Because all striving aims at and is rendered possible by such values or goods, they deserve a place in the ethical scale of values.

Goods belong to material and situational values, which as objects to be striven for constitute the basis of actional values. They are not moral, but they are morally relevant.²⁵

24. ETH, II, 152.

25. ETH, II, 155.

The basic goods value is the general situation, the real world, in which a conscious, active subject finds himself together with everything in it that he can turn to his advantage. Included in this value are all the natural conditions which sustain life, each of which is thereby a value. Of particular importance for man's teleological activities is the causal structure prevailing in the real world. Every finalistic act presupposes the causal nexus for its execution, hence, it is a basic conditional value for the existence of teleology and personality.

The general cosmic structure is the framework within which man strives and develops his character.

Within the general situation occur the various specific situations... which are valuable because they first bring a man face to face with his tasks, challenge him to commit himself and hold him to his decisions.²⁶

The specific situations constitute his field of action. In them, in the opportunity and challenge which they present, he finds the material basis of his moral life.

It would be possible to discover many more special classes and levels of situational or goods values. Everything which can become an end for a subject has value as a possible condition of his realization of moral value in his own being. Even the intention of another, a moral value for him, is a good for him to whom it is directed. Also to be

26. ETH, II, 158.

included as goods are all those things and situations which are not directly striven for as ends, but are of value as means to the ends. Thus it may be said that

in the sphere of things, in relations and in the personal milieu which fill up the life of a man, there is scarcely anything that would be absolutely indifferent to him. Everything has for him its axiological coloring, be it positive or negative.²⁷

Hence the whole of reality has goods-value as the basis of the moral good and bad in man.

4. Fundamental Moral Values

The values considered up to this point have not been moral values, but qualities of real things and situations which make the realization or attainment of moral values possible. The outstanding point of difference between the two classes of values concerns the relation of moral values to freedom. Whatever of value and disvalue is brought about by man's free choice and action, comes thereby under moral judgment. Only a free being can be blamed or praised for his acts and intentions. Only such a being is good or bad. Where there is no freedom, there is no morality.

In dealing with moral values, a different problem arises than that dealt with in the investigation of the conditional values. There the material or quality which constituted the value was plainly revealed by analysis, and

²⁷. ETH, II, 164.

was merely unfamiliar in its axiological dress. But here, in the narrower sphere of moral values, just the opposite is the case. Here the qualities are readily acknowledged as valuable, but their material content becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish, the higher the value. It therefore becomes necessary to seek information concerning the content of these higher values in the details of historical and empirical moral codes, rather than by categorial analysis.

The most fundamental moral value is goodness. Systems of morality which differ greatly in content are all agreed in this, that what is morally valuable is good. In each system the good has been identified with the highest value. It has been defined as pleasure, happiness, justice, love. To conceive of the good as the highest good or as the sum of many lesser values or goods, mistakenly returns it to the group of conditioning values, as that which can be striven for. This misconception in regard to the nature of the good has been at the root of appalling historical mistakes. The good is neither good "for something" nor "for somebody". It does not have moral value because it is either means or end.

Nor is it any more correct to speak of goodness as the enhancement of the actional values of the person. While the actional values or qualities which constitute the purposive efficacy and condition the moral content of man must be realized to some extent for him to be capable of moral action,

they do not make him a moral being. By virtue of his possession of these qualities, he stands on the threshold of morality, but there is nothing in them which can determine his goodness or his badness. These same qualities may conceivably be used to strive for and realize either values or anti-values. No matter how completely realized these values may be, they still do not determine the moral value of the subject's acts.

Since all moral values, and anti-values, are by-products of a subject's volition and action, it is evident that such volition and action alone cannot be the determinant of the goodness or badness of his acts. What does determine the moral quality of his intention and action is the value or anti-value which he intends. Good and bad are marks indicating the direction of the subject's intentions. If he intends and strives for the realization of values, he is morally good. If, on the contrary, he intends and strives to realize anti-values, he is morally bad. It is necessary here to permit the value of the intended situation or object, previously ruled out in determining the general nature of moral values, to return as the determinant of the moral quality of the intention and act.

Upon the intended situational value alone, then, depends the alternative between goodness and badness. What depends upon the value of the act itself is the height in the scale of goodness or degree of badness.²⁸

28. ETH, II, 183.

To clarify, moral values are values attaching to the acts of a subject in pursuit of values as ends. The moral quality of the act is a by-product of the striving and is independent of the intended value. The intended value comes in for consideration, however, as the determinant of the goodness or badness of the act or intention. Thus, while the intended value is not itself morally good, it forms the condition or basis of goodness. The degree of goodness, or badness, the height in the moral value scale of the intention and action is determined by the degree of the subject's commitment.

Badness or evil has been defined as the pursuit of anti-values by a subject. But it must be made clear that these anti-values are neither ideal essences nor real situations or objects contrary to value. They are values which become disvalues in a given situation because the subject's choice of them results in his rejecting higher values.

All the concrete situations of life are such that several values are involved in them at the same time. But the intention of the person who stands in the situation cannot as a rule be directed towards all at once...Now within such a constellation of values, goodness is always the turning towards the higher value, evil a turning towards the lower.²⁹

This does not mean that the lower value is denied or disregarded, but rather that it is surrendered in favor of the higher. A keen appreciation of the value that is being sacrificed for the sake of the higher value serves to reveal

29. ETH, II, 185.

more clearly the moral goodness of the choice.

Thus the two general aspects of goodness are seen to be related to the valuational grade of the intended values. That intention or act is good which, first, is directed toward the higher value, and secondly, when this choice is made despite strong, personal interest in the lower values which are sacrificed.

Since the relative rank of the competing values is the crucial factor in determining the goodness of the intention, the importance of the value scale, and the primal feeling of value grade which accompanies all feeling for values is plainly evident.

As a real sense of the comparative worth of values and as a power giving direction to the pursuit of them... [this feeling for grade] is the narrower and specific basis of moral goodness in man, as well as of the value in the intention of his acts.³⁰

Goodness is the objective manifestation of this awareness of the ideal realm of values and the gradation which prevails in it. Man is neither good nor bad, but builds his own moral being by the decisions which he makes. Hence, goodness is a fundamental moral claim which is made upon everyone. While more special values or higher degrees of goodness may be realized by some, every person "ought" to choose the higher values within the limits of his ethos.

In addition to goodness, Hartmann finds other moral

30. ETH, II, 190.

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values which he also regards as fundamental because as he puts it, "they fall short of being virtues in the proper sense and...are presupposed in the virtues."³¹ These values are nobility, richness of experience, and purity.

Nobility presupposes goodness, but is comparable to it neither in content nor in extent. It is neither an intensification nor a specialization of it, but something new. It is a special attitude which the subject introduces in the selection of values. In the discussion of goodness, it was seen that the actional limitations of the subject were such that it was impossible for him to choose even all the values of equal grade in a specific situation. It is this complexity of valuational content, coupled with the fact that only a few of the values can be chosen which gives scope to the unique value of nobility.

The value selected by the subject, with due consideration of the promptings of the intuitive sense of value and grade, is usually a value which is in conformity with the ethos of the subject's society. But the noble individual prefers the uncommon values which are as yet unnoticed or unrealized by society. He is the pioneer, the revolutionary, whose devotion to uncommon values brings them to the attention of others who may then make the realization of the uncommon value their common goal. But as soon as this happens,

31. ETH, II, 205.

as soon as the uncommon has become the common, some new value or group of values becomes the end of the noble. Thus the noble individual and the special attitude toward values which is nobility are always found at the growing point of the ethos. Without the noble the process would stagnate. His pursuit of the uncommon values is the means by which they are tested to determine their fitness as ends to which others may commit themselves.

Nobility imposes no universal ought as does goodness. By its nature it can only be characteristic of relatively few individuals. The noble individual aims at the uncommon values with a singleness of purpose which is almost fanatical and a reckless disdain of the consequences for either himself or for other values. He pursues those values which tend to raise a man above the common level of goodness. He seeks the exclusive development of the values which he believes important.

Opposed to this one-sided concentration upon preferred values, which is both the strength and weakness of nobility as a value, is the tendency in the human ethos which seeks the inclusion of all values in experience. While the single-minded devotion to particular values which is characteristic of the noble is important for the development of the ethos, it is necessary and desirable that other values should not be lost in the process. Hence, this tendency which seeks breadth and diversity of value-experience, fulness of experi-

ence, is of value.

From this point of view not unity of effort is the highest concern, but many-sidedness and diversity of interest, all-round participation in values as an ideal, the ethical exploitation of life which understands and embraces everything, and with this also axiological richness of content and development of personality, ethical greatness in the sense of spacious capacity for everything that is in itself valuable, positive breadth of valuational judgment.³²

To one who seeks this fulness, participation in conflict, in joy, suffering, success, defeat--all of life is of value. No situation or experience is without its value for him who is sensitive to its presence.

In this awareness of the richness of the value content of life, the importance of the value scale fades. The lower values too have their contribution to make. Value adheres in fact to all the content of moral life, even to failure, deficiency, and wrong-doing. This does not mean, however, that what is bad becomes good. Badness is the pursuit of disvalues, while this tendency to inclusiveness is only an attitude of many-sided openness, of participation and appreciation. It is the tendency to do inward justice to life by appreciation of all that it has to offer.

Standing in bold contrast to this inclusiveness is purity. Purity is the negative side of goodness. It is not the pursuit of higher values, but the turning away from lower ones. It is this fact which reveals the antinomy between

32. ETH, II, 206.

inclusiveness and purity. The tendency of inclusiveness is to open itself to everything, while "purity bars out everything which is in conflict with any value."³³ The former seeks a fulness of moral experience while the aim of the latter is lack of it. From the point of view of purity, innocence is the highest good.

The pure-minded man is a living testimony to the validity of an a priori knowledge of value. He exhibits a moral instinct whereby he may distinguish good and evil without any experience of them. Wherever purity is met with in human conduct, it reveals itself as sincerity, frankness, lack of duplicity, single-mindedness in love and hate, wholehearted pursuit of ends. The pure-minded man reveals his true nature and feelings in all his actions. His actions are simple expressions of his natural impulses. He is morally unspoiled.

Because such lack of double or hidden meaning is uncommon in human conduct, it bestows upon the pure-minded man a peculiar power. Since he himself is thoroughly straightforward and honest, he deems all others the same, taking them and their actions at face value. The guilty man sees in this guilelessness his own condemnation, a symbol of what he ought to be and is not. The mere existence of the pure-minded man is thus a positive power for goodness, "a wander-

33. ETH, II, 211.

ing conscience for the impure mind."³⁴ By him are others judged without any judgment on his part. Simply by his purity, impurity stands condemned.

No merit attaches to one who has purity simply because he has it. It differs from other moral values in that it can neither be striven for nor actualized. It is not a by-product of striving for other values, but is a gift. If it is not possessed it is forever unattainable; once lost, it cannot be regained. However, it is possible to strive to preserve it, and the impulse to do so is the strictly moral element in the ethos of the pure.

5. Special Moral Values or Virtues

Virtues are the values of human conduct itself, the good connected with certain relations.

Among them the proposition holds necessarily, that moral values are based upon situational values, that is, that they attach to the intention which is directed to valuable situations, and that their specific character as compared with the latter is nevertheless independent of the connection.³⁵

Although the valuational height of the virtues is not determined by their relation to the intended situational height, their material content is distinguished by the situational value to which they are related. But this conditioning relation fails to make clear the specific, unique characteristics

34. ETH, II, 216.

35. ETH, II, 225.

of the several virtues. Those can only be supplied by the living sense of values.

In the study of the virtues, as in that of the fundamental moral values, the values to be analysed are those which have been prominent in the ethos of some historical culture. Many values no less important will be overlooked by such a procedure, but it is the best that can be done at the present stage if one is to be guided by the phenomena and not by one's theories.

Here there is no question as to completeness, but as to the quality of the manifold values, as to the contrasting character of the groups, the valuational relations produced, the conflict between values, and so on.³⁶

The values must be taken as presented, even if thus considered they do not exhibit any great degree of unity or order. Here also there is no question concerning the means by which the virtues may be realized. That is the problem of religion. For ethics "the only question is concerning the valuational quality of the single virtue itself, so far as it can be seen and defined."³⁷ By analyzing those values which have been raised to prominence in the developing process of morality, something may be learned of the general structure of the realm of values.

36. ETH, II, 226.

37. ETH, II, 227.

a. Virtues of Antiquity

When Plato sought to determine the nature and condition of goodness or well-being, whether of the individual or of the state, he found four qualities to be essential. These four qualities or virtues were wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. While Plato regarded justice as the crown or sum of the other virtues, Hartmann feels that it is really the lowest, the basic virtue which makes possible the development of all higher ones.

The primary significance of justice is its tendency to counteract the crude egoism of the individual...The essential feature in it is from the outset the idea of equality: equal rights, equal duty with others, whether the individual or the whole of the community, on the principle that this is the basic condition of all communal life.³⁸

This is evident in the fact that justice is purely negative, consisting of prohibitions designed to safeguard the life, property, and freedom of each against all. In this way it is an objective means of preserving the communal and cultural values necessary for the attainment of higher values.

As a disposition of the individual to be "just" and treat his fellow men as equals, to grant to all the basic conditions for moral life and growth, justice is a moral value. In this fact lies the moral value of all willing obedience to laws, of good citizenship. While the objective existence of an order of laws and law enforcement agencies

38. ETH, II, 228.

is itself of value,

the free commitment to the right, the inner conquest of contrary impulses of desire and fear, of ambition and will to power, are as regards value incomparably higher than all situational values, which can ensue upon such commitment.³⁹

It is this free commitment and intention on the part of the individual which raises justice in the scale of values from a goods-value to a virtue. It is also an indication that the individual is aware of his belonging to and participation in a community, where the enjoyment of basic rights and privileges involves the acceptance of responsibilities and restrictions, by each and all. As he voluntarily subordinates himself to the good of the whole, he identifies himself with the whole, and recognizes in its laws and demands, the laws and demands which he as a citizen imposes upon himself as an individual. This sense of identity with the whole on the part of the individual citizens is the primal element in the ethical being of a state, and wherever it is strong, the community flourishes.

As an objective or situational value justice is purely negative. But considered as a moral quality of the individual it is seen in its positive aspect as the acceptance of one's responsibility to establish, sustain, and improve communal order and equality of opportunity in the interest of group solidarity. The emphasis is upon conservation of

39. ETH, II, 233.

achieved social values, at least a minimum of freedom for all.

The meaning of wisdom, another of the Platonic virtues, has been distorted or lost sight of. Its main emphasis, as interpreted today, is upon the intellectual values of truth and knowledge. These, however, are far from its essence. Conceived as the pursuit or possession of truth and knowledge, it has led individuals to draw apart from practical affairs and wrap themselves in contemplative self-indulgence in search of "wisdom".

Such arid intellectualism is far removed from wisdom. Wisdom is not found or demonstrated by withdrawal from life, but by a sensing of the valuational richness which it contains.

It is the penetration of the valuational sense into life, into all discrimination, into every reaction and action; even down to the spontaneous valuational responses which accompany every experience; it is the fulfilment of one's whole ethical Being with its points of view, the fixed and basic attitude of the practical consequences towards values.⁴⁰

It is an unreflective, intuitive attitude of appraisal and awareness of values which the wise man carries into all the relations of his life.

Wisdom as a virtue is a special kind of commitment to life in general. It is a recognition of life's richness as revealed by the primal sense of values and a grateful appre-

40. ETH, II, 239.

ciation for values wherever they are found. The wise man in his understanding and appreciation of the valuational fullness of life resolves in his own person the antinomy of the range and the grade of values. He is committed to participation with understanding and appreciation in life's richness, ever seeking a greater awareness of it.

But this commitment to participation in life's fulness must be sustained and supplemented by the ability to act and to endure.

The wisest outlook is morally impotent unless active energy, which is ready to cope with obstacles, reinforces it, especially when one's own life, welfare, and happiness must be risked.⁴¹

This reinforcing energy is courage. Although it is most conspicuous in acts of heroism, it is not confined to such acts.

It inheres in all decisive effort, in all steadfast perseverance, in all quietly persistent tenacity; that is, wherever there is an element of adventure in a situation, which requires personal commitment and demands sacrifice.⁴²

It is the deliberate steadfast staking of one's life upon one's choice of values. Without this courageous execution of intended acts, the wisest commitment would be impotent and meaningless.

But courage is not merely a matter of willingness to stake one's life on the choices one has made. An even higher

41. ETH, II, 245.

42. ETH, II, 245.

degree of courage is demanded of one, who because of circumstances, is in a position where his decisions and acts will determine the lives of others. Then courage is the willingness to bear responsibility for the consequences of one's acts. One who can bear such responsibility and rejoice in it is the richer because of it.

Courage is demanded of all who would be moral. Every situation presents its conflicts which require decisions. Each of these takes courage, the courage to believe in one's decisions and to see them through. Thus even the willingness to live and participate in life is courageous.

The other Platonic virtue, temperance or self-control, is not to be understood as purely negative. It has been too long thought of as the suppression of natural desires in relation to the view of human nature as inherently evil. Such a view is both psychologically and ethically false. The natural desires and emotions of man are the substance of his spiritual life, the material out of which something higher and more worthy may be made. Without them there is no spiritual life. And the Ought which these affections express is not to be condemned as the Ought of anti-values. "Every genuine Ought is positive. It demands not destruction but construction, the creation of the higher out of the lower."⁴³

Thus the positive meaning of self-control is the control

43. ETH, II, 250.

and direction of the affections for the welfare of the whole of which they are a part. It is not to be understood as denying or negating the natural desires, but as the possession of sufficient power over them to give each its proper place, to establish right proportion among them, and to so unify and guide them that they may serve and enrichen spiritual life rather than destroy it. It is the harmonizing of the world of desires for the building of inner life; it is capacity for inner self-direction.

As a moral value, self-control may not rank as high in the scale as either wisdom or courage, both of which are open to almost infinite upward development, but it is to the individual what justice is to society, the basic condition of higher moral and spiritual development.

The four Platonic virtues by no means exhaust the axiological contribution of Greek thought. Aristotle also added much that was of merit. His theory of the golden mean has been popularly understood as a theory that moderation in all things is the ideal. Critics have been quick to point out that this is absurd for it is one of the unique characteristics of moral values that they have no upward limit but may be augmented to an infinite degree without becoming disvalues. Then it is evident that "nothing to excess" is not the whole of Aristotle's theory of the mean.

The positive meaning of his theory is clearly seen when it is realized that virtues are two-dimensional, both

real and ideal. A virtue is at one and the same time both a mean and an extreme. In its material content, and as the behavior of a real being, it is something real. As moral value, it is an ideal formation independent of the real. In the real dimension, there may be an excess or a deficiency of material content, either of which is vice. Here the mean is the desirable position. But in the value dimension, which contains the extremes of good and bad, the nearer the approach to the good extreme, the more valuable the act.

Hartmann describes this relationship in spatial or geometrical terms in which the real and the ideal dimensions are at right angles to each other. If only the real dimension were considered, virtue would be the mean between the two extremes, excess and deficiency. But the introduction of the value dimension bends the straight line into a parabola,

for both the ontological extremes are in meaning vices (the lower extremes), while the intermediate elements approximate to the good (the higher extreme) and in a culminating point attain the status of ἀρετή [virtue]. This therefore is ontologically at a point midway, but axiologically it is at the higher point. From it the curve falls away again towards another vice.⁴⁴

While this theory is an interesting addition to axiology, and, as used by Aristotle, revealed many virtues previously unknown as such, its real merit lies in the fact that it is most rewarding in the analysis of the more special values.

44. ETH, II, 255-256.

Thus it is possible by means of Aristotle's theory to learn something of values and the value realm which is revealed by no other theory.

Some interesting additions are thus made to the known values. Among these are liberality, mildness (righteous indignation), magnificence (behavior befitting greatness), ambition (which is very close to self-control or right proportions), magnanimity or self-esteem based upon genuine greatness. To underestimate one's worth is equally as bad as to overestimate. The Socratic dictum: Know thyself, is supplemented by the additional counsel: Be and act thyself. Further virtues are those of right attitude toward the fortune and misfortune of others, a desire to see each get his due, and a sense of shame because of one's conduct either before or after one has acted.

One characteristic of all these virtues is their emotional basis. In thus recognizing the positive moral value content of the emotive sphere, Aristotle was far in advance of his times and made a significant contribution to value theory.

b. The Christian Virtues

The ethos of antiquity underwent a considerable transformation as a result of the development of Christianity. The old virtues were either reinterpreted in the light of Christian teaching, or were superseded by new virtues.

At the heart of the Christian system of virtues is brotherly love, the interest in the welfare of others. This is not to be understood as love in general, but as a personal disposition or intention to treat others as persons. It is a loving, interested concern, an affirmative well-wishing for others, not because of their actual worth, but because of their human potentiality. It is a spontaneous, unreflective intention to do good to and for another for his own sake.

Brotherly love goes beyond justice in its interest in the entire well-being of others. Where justice is concerned with the equalizing and protection of surface rights, and is primarily negative, love enters the realm of spirit, seeking to remove any external conditions which might hinder the realization of the possibilities contained in the person. It is a "living sense of another's worth...spending itself upon a man's total humanity, upon that in him which is capable and worthy of life."⁴⁵ It is not a reaction to his momentary condition but a spontaneous interest in him as a fellow being, a person.

Genuine brotherly love makes possible the direct knowledge of another person's ethos and ego. The emotional aprisorm of love transcends the egocentric predicament, it enables one to escape the solipsistic confines of one's own

45. ETH, II, 273.

consciousness and directly, intimately live and share the experiences of another person. This does not mean an identity of persons, but simply that the other's experience becomes one's own. The external material content of the experience is not, of course, included in this act. It is only a comprehension of the spiritual and emotional conflicts of the other person. But all real knowledge of the ethos of another must come through such transcendent intrusion into another's being.

The inner disposition to place another's welfare on the same level as one's own, to lose oneself in the interest of others creates a stronger and more secure social bond than does justice. When a sufficient number of persons love with such a self-transcending love, they may determine the ultimate destiny of society.

Truthfulness, as a virtue, is the intention of the person to express what he thinks or believes, to establish an objective agreement between the existing situation, which is what he says or does, and his thoughts or conviction. To fail to express one's inner thoughts and convictions, and to deliberately express different ones, is to lie and to degrade one's own personality.

Closely related to truthfulness is another virtue, reliability. It is an extension of present truthfulness into the future. It is "the capacity of a man so to promise that the other man can be sure that the promise will be dis-

charged."⁴⁶ The reliable or trustworthy man is truthful in that his promise is an expression in word or deed of his true disposition. He is reliable in that he intends to keep his promise even though his disposition be changed afterwards.

This capacity to predetermine his future conduct is the mark of the morally mature man. By being true to his promises he establishes a bond of continuity and identity between the self which he is today and the self he will be tomorrow. If he is unfaithful to his promises, he renounces the self which he was at the time the promise was made. Thus to be unfaithful to one's promises is to be unfaithful to one's own personality, for the capacity for predetermination and purposive efficacy implied in a promise is the mark of man's ethical being.

Fidelity is this trustworthiness expanded to include not merely definite commitments of the person, but a general disposition of stability and constancy of attitude toward others. It is the mark of one whose sympathy, friendship, and love, is not a fickle, transitory thing, but something which can be depended upon.

Truthfulness and reliability as attitudes of the subject, are moral values, independent of their recognition by others. But they may also become values for those toward whom they are directed. This result, however, is dependent

46. ETH, II, 287.

upon the attitude of those who are the objects of the truthful or reliable disposition. The attitude of the object person must be one of acceptance of the word and deed of the subject as true or reliable.

This attitude of acceptance is faith, or trust, and is itself a virtue of one who has the capacity for it. It is "the capacity for co-operation."⁴⁷ All human relations are based upon it. The bond between men who trust each other is even more fundamental than the bond of love or equality. Without faith, no community or society can long exist. Lack of faith in the group or in individual members of the group is a warning signal of impending disruption of the group.

When one has faith in another, he places himself in the other's hands. Thus faith requires courage of the one who has it, but it also places an obligation upon the one toward whom it is directed.

Real trust is always a claim imposed upon the other person--namely to justify the trust--but at the same time and along with this it is a precious gift, an honour conferred upon the person.⁴⁸

It is this obligation and honour which gives to faith its creative power, its ability to "remove mountains". There is a tendency in man to do what is expected of him, to measure up. Hence, within limits, to trust a man is to make him trustworthy, while a man who is undeservedly labeled untrust-

47. ETH, II, 294.

48. ETH, II, 292.

worthy tends to become so.

Faith, directed toward one who is unworthy of it, may make him aware of his unworthiness and set in motion a process of regeneration. There is something good in everyone which can be developed if encouraged and appreciated. This encouragement and appreciation is the office of faith. This is the secret of its transforming power.

The virtues of the Christian ethos which have been considered thus far have been dispositions of one person to seek to understand the inner world of another. But this tendency can be carried too far. An individual has a right to some privacy. Hence the disposition of a person to respect another's claim to privacy, to refrain from looking into the depths of his soul, is also, as a limit to the intrusiveness of love and trust, a virtue. This virtue, which Hartmann calls aloofness, is an expression of reverence for personality. One who has a sense of his own worth thus shows his respect for the worth of another.

The Grecian virtues, too, need a similar limit. They tended to make the man who possessed them complacent and self-satisfied. The Christian ethos, with its recognition of modesty and humility, virtues which were foreign to the Greeks, provides this limit.

Modesty is "reticence in the presence of another's moral worth, due to the consciousness of one's own unworthiness."⁴⁹

49. ETH, II, 298.

The modest man does not belittle himself, but rather sets his moral standards high. No matter how much he may achieve, there is always something to which he can look up, something yet undone. He is modest, even when in the presence of persons morally inferior to him, for he does not judge himself by others, but by the ideal standard which he has set up for himself.

Just as the consciousness of his shortcomings causes man to be modest in relation to others, so it causes him to be humble. Without any comparison with others, with nothing but the consciousness of falling short of the mark, he is aware of his own unworthiness. His humility is balanced, however by a justifiable pride in having set for himself an unattainable standard.

Other values may be discovered in social intercourse, convention, and custom. Though these are not dispositional values, they are significant as the social framework in which higher values are developed and expressed. The separate existing customs or conventions are never of absolute value. What is important or valuable is that there should be some social forms to instill social feeling and order in the individual. Thus social forms, in themselves of no great ethical import, are indirectly given moral significance. Indeed, the disposition to abide by the established conventions, to observe the social amenities may rise to a considerable height in the scale of values.

c. Other Special Moral Values

Man has a tendency to become absorbed in the immediate tasks of life, to persist in being. He may be stirred into developing in himself a greater awareness of life and its values, and may learn self-discipline as a necessary means to sharing in the enjoyment of these values. If sufficiently stirred and challenged he may transcend the limitations of his own self-interest and interest himself in and expend his energy for the welfare of his neighbors. All this is necessary to give to life its valuational fulness, to give content to the ethos of man. But if the attention and interest of man is centered upon the present, or the very near future, it is easy for him to lose his sense of direction. There is need here for a counterpoise, for an individual or individuals who can anticipate the far-distant future and dedicate themselves to its actualization. These far-distant ideals must be discerned to give objective reference and a sense of direction to those who may sometimes become lost and confused in the turmoil of the present.

Man's nature is such that he wants to see the fruits of his labor. He longs for assurance that his work is not in vain, that he is a contributor to society. Hence it requires great self-conquest and self-renunciation to give oneself over to values which will not be realized now nor for years. To be only a means, to lose oneself in the service of far-distant ends is difficult and demands an ethos closely akin

to nobility. Yet it is just such sacrificial disposition toward remote values which constitutes the moral value which Nietzsche called Fernstenliebe (love of the remotest). Nietzsche used this term to show how this value contrasted with neighbor-love, the love of the nearest. While his denial of the value of the latter is a mistake, the conflict which he discovered is undeniable. Love of the near expends itself upon raising the fallen, strengthening the weak, and such a process is a hindrance to progress toward the remote ideal. It results at best in a leveling of mankind.

This is what love of the remotest, as the ethos of progress must disavow. It must unearth again the principle of selection which love of the nearest has buried. It must reinstate the worthiest, the ethically strong and aspiring, and favour him at the cost of the man who is sinking.⁵⁰

Thus, love of the remotest must disregard the individual or the community, for it aims at neither, but at an individual and a community which is ideal. Whatever the cost, there must be progress toward this ideal.

In like manner, justice conflicts with love of the remotest.

In the eyes of justice men are equal; and in so far as they are not equal, they ought to be. Love of the remotest sees the opposite: men are not equal, and not only in nature and character, but also ethically they are not of equal worth in their human potentiality.⁵¹

50. ETH, II, 319.

51. ETH, II, 321.

Not only are men unequal, but they should be so. It is by virtue of this inequality that the human race evolves. The greater the disparity between men, the greater the activity in the developmental process. Man must overcome and deny the values for which he sacrificed his egoism, but not to return to egoism, but to move on to a new and higher ethos. The noble, the great, the ideal-intoxicated, must press on toward higher ends, ignoring the claims of the immediate.

Such disregard of existing, recognized values constitutes a revolution in the ethos, and is resisted by those who are not like-minded. The prophet is considered a traitor to his own day because he transfers his allegiance to the future. This makes commitment to the far-distant even more difficult. But it must not be given up. In consecration to the future lies man's destiny. He has come this far led on by ideals. Though he began in a very primitive state, he has the potential capacity to attain the highest. Whatever advance he makes will be made by his efforts. What gives him courage and hope is the astonishing fact that "within the limits of actual possibility...in the long run man always becomes what he wills to become."⁵² It is a great venture requiring great faith, a staking of one's life on the importance of the evolving ethos of humanity. By this commitment, one binds oneself with an unbreakable bond to the far-away future.

52. ETH, II, 328.

But the ultimate value cannot be one which demands, unendingly, self-sacrifice and surrender or the axiological process would remain empty of content. The meaning of moral endeavor cannot be found in more tasks, more striving. Somewhere the process must eventuate in absolute values which are realized in the present. Such values are those which follow.

The first of these was also named by Nietzsche who called it Schenkende Tugend (radiant virtue). This is the attitude of one who is filled with spiritual riches which he cannot keep to himself but must impart to others. The values which the radiant spirit gives to others are not useful as means to other ends, but have worth only in their own structures. He sacrifices nothing in the giving of these values. He simply overflows, and all who can, receive.

This virtue

has no end in view, it is the absolutely final member among the values, a bloom, which, even without fruit, purely in itself, is its own excuse for being...Here is the valuational boundary of creation and elaboration and at the same time of the Ought. The highest value of life is inevitably a spending of life...It is itself the final creation, the ultimate meaning, an ethical Being in and for itself--a kingly virtue.⁵³

The ultimate value, that which gives meaning to moral endeavor, to purposive striving, is itself purposeless. The end of the process is in the process itself. The fulfillment,

53. ETH, II, 337.

the end for which the process exists, the "useless" product, is the sheer fulness of living which by its overflow enriches the lives of others.

Personality as a value differs from all those previously considered in that it is not a universal value, nor even a group value. Its claim is limited to one person only, demanding that he express himself in his valuations and his conduct. It cannot hold for even two persons for the preferential tendencies of one individual are to some degree different from the tendencies, the ethos, of all other individuals. Hence what is good for him, what he ought to do, is different from what another ought to do. The only universal claim that may be voiced concerning personality is that "everyone should will individually and act in the spirit of his own personal ethos."⁵⁴

The material content of personality is different in every man. The components which make it up are the general values which do impose universal obligations, but each individual combines them in his own way according to the values which he selects and realizes. In his own way and according to his own sense of values, every man pursues the general values, and thereby realizes his own individual ethos. Through the individuality which he expresses in his selection of and commitment to values, he becomes unique and irreplace-

54. ETH, II, 359.

able. No other one can reflect even the same values in quite the same way. The disposition, the striving, the realization of values which is his, and which constitutes his personality, will never be duplicated.

If the system of values were one-dimensional, individuality regarding values would require that each individual be slightly better or worse than other individuals if he differed from them, for goodness, it was seen, is the preference for the higher values in a given situation. In a linear system of values, one or the other individual who made a different choice in a given situation would be bad since he failed to choose the highest value. But the multi-dimensional structure of the value realm gives scope to individual preferences. Because many values which are of equal rank may be discerned in one situation, it is possible for different individuals to make differing commitments in the same situation and yet all be equally good, each choosing the best possible. It is left up to the person himself to make the final selection. And here the individual may give free play to the axiological preferences which are his. Thus the actional limitations of the situation and the preferential trends of the individual ethos combine to produce a unique joint-product, the like of which has never been before, nor will ever be again.

Personality increases and decreases in accordance with the amount of individuation and the approximation of the

actual person to his ideal ethos. The amount of individuation increases in the direction of nobility as the individual prefers values other than the typical ones. A greater degree of individuation, when accompanied by a nearer approach to the individual ideal ethos, a greater degree of value realization, produces a better, more meaningful personality.

The individualistic ethos of personality, like other non-typical values, conflicts with the universal ethos. The demand to be different, to express one's own unique nature is opposed by the equalitarian ethos of justice. Here it must be remembered that personality as perhaps the ultimate value is based upon the other more universal values which constitute the basis of all morality.

To be a personality without fulfilling the commandments of justice, truthfulness, fidelity or brotherly love, produces an inner displacement, a chaotic and false morality without any ethical foundation; such a personality operates in vain, it is a moral swindle.⁵⁵

This is in accord with the nature of personality as a moral value which must be realized indirectly in the pursuit and realization of other more general values. But by commitment to these more general values in accordance with his own valuational perspective, the individual may develop his own unique value, his personality.

But personality is not completely realized until it be-

55. ETH, II, 361.

comes a value for someone. Personality longs to be appreciated and mirrored. Hence, it requires a complementary value, personal love, in which it is fulfilled by becoming valuable for someone.

Personal love does not accept the actual empirical self or ethos, but sees through it to the ideal self beyond. Thus with the eyes of love, and of faith, a person may love one who is morally imperfect and undeveloped. For this reason love is called blind; it apparently fails to see the faults of the loved one. But here, despite the reality of these faults, it is the unloving man who is blind. Love is blind in the sense that it does not see what is before its eyes. It sees through by intuitive emotional insight to the ideal personality. It loves the real, not for what it is, but for what it might be. It builds and feeds upon faith in the potentialities for higher worth sensed in the loved one, though unseen or unrealized.

The distinctive value of love, its virtue, is its disposition to trust, and to serve the one loved. Its distinctive power is the capacity to awaken a response in the object of the love. Taking the ideal self of the beloved as the real self, the lover becomes a creative guiding will striving to actualize this ideal. While it is never possible to strive to realize one's own ethos, one can strive to realize that which one beholds with the eyes of love in another. The value which love has for its end is the moral being of the

loved one. The one who loves, by his love, causes this being to approach and become what it is in idea and what he believes it to be. The one who is loved is led to new heights, moved to new endeavors by his desire to become what he already is in the eyes of the one who loves him. The power of regeneration which was seen in trust is also found here in the power of the affirmative disposition and faith of love.

When the deep longing of the self to be appreciated and understood is met, then much of suffering, pain, sorrow, and happiness seems insignificant in comparison. The suffering of one who loves can even be happiness, his happiness be pain. To love is to awaken to an entire new realm of richest values. New insights are given, new depths of meaning and living are revealed. From personal love comes an understanding which is denied to the unloving, a deep and inward communion which reveals to man what must otherwise remain unknown to him. "A life of love is a life spent in the knowledge of what is best worth knowing, a life of participation in the highest that is in man."⁵⁶

Thus personal love gives ultimate meaning to life by anticipating man's realization of his ideal essence. By love, personality becomes not only in itself but for itself. Here teleology turns back upon itself and the means becomes the end.

56. ETH, II, 381.

6. The Order of the Realm of Values

This analysis of moral values and their relationships, which was begun with high hopes that it would reveal at least the general structure of the value realm, is disappointing in its results. What the survey has revealed regarding this structure is inadequate for the formulation of a system or table of values. Analysis has made it possible to discriminate the various values and responses more exactly, but this is really more a matter of defining the material contents more accurately, while the distinctive characteristics of the values remain a matter of feeling. It is true that in certain narrow groups of values some order and gradation has been discovered, but the gaps between these groups are too large, and the groups involved too heterogeneous to permit any general systematization at this inconclusive stage of the research. But analysis has at least revealed the great difficulty and complexity of the problem. It has provided "the initial orientation in the realm of values."⁵⁷

From this initial orientation it is evident that the table of values, like every diversified object, has its structural laws. By analysis of the moral values, something of the nature of these laws has been suggested. Hartmann says,

57. ETH, II, 388.

In surveying the whole series of developed values, we can, without too great difficulty, discriminate among them laws of six different types of connection, which fall into three groups of two laws each.⁵⁸

These laws are laws of stratification and foundation, laws of opposition and complementation, and laws of valuational height and valuational strength. While it is not always easy or possible to set forth the laws clearly, these types of regularity are clearly evident. Particularly helpful in determining the nature of these laws is the existence of analogous laws in other diversified realms such as that of the categories.

The four laws of categorial stratification, that is, recurrence, transformation, novelty, and distance between strata, are found, with certain modifications, to be operative to some extent in the valuational realm. According to these laws, the lower elements recur in the higher elements as partial factors, but they remain unchanged in essence. But the higher form of which they are a part is always something new. This relation of higher and lower forms is not an unbroken relation, for the forms are in strata which are separated from one another by distinct intervals.

In the value realm, the law of recurrence retains much of its force in the lower, goods-values, but almost entirely disappears in the moral values. Here the laws of transfor-

58. ETH, II, 389.

mation and novelty are more evident. The autonomy of the higher values is far more apparent than that of the higher categorial forms. The distances between strata are greater, particularly between the moral values proper and the values of goods and situations.

This laxity of the stratificational laws in the realm of values is not due to any weakness on their part, but because another kind of connectional laws enter the picture. The only one of these laws which can be clearly seen at the present stage is that seen in the conditioning relation between goods and situational values and moral values.

In this relation, the lower values, the goods or situational values, do not reappear as constituents of the new, higher value. Nor is the lower value necessarily realized in the realization of the higher. Moral value is dependent upon the disposition rather than the consequences. Consequently, the valuational height of the higher, moral value is independent of the height of the lower conditioning value.

Thus wherever the conditioning relation occurs, there is a break in the stratification. Below this break, in the conditioning values of goods and situations, the laws of stratification are determinant. Above this break, in the strata of moral values, they are no longer determinant, but are forced into the background by the new order represented by the conditioning relation.

By a further analysis of the antinomic relation of val-

ues, and of the Aristotelean virtues, Hartmann shows that each of these virtues is not only a mean between two extreme disvalues, but also a synthesis of two values. Thus bravery is neither boldness nor cold foresight alone, but a synthesis of both.

This has important implications for the higher moral values such as brotherly love, justice, truthfulness, faith. It means that each of them is to be understood as an extreme which must be countered by another extreme. The syntheses of extremes are apprehended by the emotional sense of values in the lower forms of moral values, but are lacking in the higher forms, or rather are not discerned in them. Even though the synthesis of the higher values is not discovered by the sense of values, yet this same sense of values longs for such a synthesis. This longing, in the face of all existing antitheses, is due to the fact that in all actual conflicts, man's conduct must be a unity. From this fact comes a necessary postulate of ethics; only synthesis in the face of antithesis, should be called virtue, since the one-sided values are not worthy of the name. All valuational elements taken alone are tyrannical and need to be balanced by a counterweight. Justice, brotherly love, these and all the other higher values can become fanatical. Only a love which was at the same time just, and a justice which was loving could be an ideal virtue. Thus every value reaches its true fulfillment only in its synthesis with all, even if this is

only in Idea, and never in actuality.

This need for other values for fulfillment is not limited to values in oppositional relations. It is seen to be a common phenomenon in the value realm. Trust is only fulfilled in trustworthiness, personality in personal love, bravery in the worth of the good for which one is brave. One value requires the other for its completion, although its moral worth is not in any way dependent upon the complementary value,

except that without the response there is not a complete fulfillment or actualization. Here then the conditioning relation is not something constituent in the value, but only something which carries it out and brings it to completion. To speak more exactly, the conditioning does not affect the moral value itself, but only its subjoined goods-value.⁵⁹

All that is required is that to every moral attitude of one person there shall correspond a given attitude on the part of the other. The complementary law is a law of adequate reciprocity in human behavior, a need for synthesis of attitude and response for the fulfillment of the meaning of values.

The problem of gradation has been prominent throughout the entire analysis of values. Its importance for ethics has become increasingly apparent, but the solution of it has become increasingly unlikely. The investigation has revealed a great deal about narrow groups of values, as was seen pre-

59. ETH, II, 439.

viously in considering the different types of valuational relations. But each of these types and its various laws has some limitation which prevents its application as a universally valid principle of gradation.

The oppositional relation offers some sort of regularity of principle when it is made clear that in every antinomy, the synthesis of the antinomic elements is higher than the elements united in it. Thus it might be said that,

the more complex the synthesis, the more antinomical the elements united in it, and the more firm the fusion, so much the higher does it stand in the order of rank.⁶⁰

This is a distinguishing mark which is universally applicable to moral values. Still, from it alone, a comprehensive theory as to the grade of values cannot be constructed, for a second factor must be considered, that of valuational strength.

In the realm of the categories, the law of strength and its corollaries, the laws of material and freedom, constitute the basic categorial laws, the laws of dependence, similar in content to the laws of stratification. According to these laws of dependence, the higher principles are always dependent upon the lower for raw material, but have unlimited scope above them as something new. Hence the lower principles are the stronger. The higher principles cannot annul or alter them, but only build upon them.

60. ETH, II, 445.

Just as was the case with the laws of stratification, the laws of dependence cannot be assumed to apply unchanged in the valuational realm. The law of strength, like the law of stratification, fades into the background as the constituent elements of the higher principles become less and less discernible, while the laws of material and freedom become increasingly evident. But the basic law of strength is operative, even though not easily discernible. It reveals itself in the scale of responses to values (approval, acceptance, respect, admiration, enthusiasm). Thus the strength of a value is measured by the seriousness of offense against it, while its height is determined by the worth of its realization. Then the meaning of the categorial laws of dependence, carried over into the value realm is this:

The higher value is always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this sense the weaker; its fulfilment is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the fulfilment of lower values. But the more unconditioned, the more elementary, and in this sense the stronger value is always the lower; it is only a base for the moral life, not a fulfilment of its meaning.

This is equivalent to saying: the most grievous transgressions are those against the lowest values, but the greatest moral desert attaches to the highest values.⁶¹

While it is questionable whether this law holds unbroken sway through the entire value system, it may be assumed that above and below the dividing line between goods-values and moral values, it is valid.

61. ETH, II, 452.

This law explains the reason for man's disregard of higher values when lower values are lacking. When a man is hungry in body, his soul-hunger is silenced or drowned out by the clamor of the stronger, more elementary values for fulfillment. Security for self and loved ones thus may outweigh liberty.

The validity of this law is unquestioned among the moral values. Murder, theft, and other crimes against body and property are felt to be the most serious moral transgressions because the justice they violate is basic to social and communal life and the higher values which may be realized in it. On the other hand, if radiant virtue or personal love is lacking, it constitutes no radical danger to anyone, just the higher moral content is missing.

Thus is it clearly seen that there are two equally important orders of gradation in the realm of values, strength and height, tending in opposite directions. Then in regard to valuational grade, as well as contrasting values, a synthesis is the ideal. Here it is a synthesis of two tendencies or preferences, a preference for the higher value, and a preference for the stronger. The good as preference for the higher values has another side, an obligation not to violate the lower and stronger value.

Genuine morality must build from below up and work incessantly at the foundation; and this the more strenuously, the higher it builds; for the foundation has so much to carry...Who wills the height

must first will the conditions.⁶²

The fulfillment of the meaning of humanity is not found in these conditions, but in the heights which are aspired to and attained. But the aspiration and attainment are possible only upon a foundation firmly laid.

62. ETH, II, 461-462.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICISM

It has been the task and purpose of this thesis up to this point to present an appreciative exposition of Hartmann's theory of the origin, nature, and function of value, together with an analysis of a particular group of values in the hope that such analysis would reveal more details about values. Now that Hartmann's view is more or less clearly set forth, the task of evaluating it arises.

Regardless of the trend of one's own axiological thinking, one must feel that Hartmann's work is truly a great contribution to axiology. Though some may not agree with all of his conclusions, or his premises, the scholarly thoroughness with which his argument is presented must win universal approval. Sidney Hook, whose philosophical views are diametrically opposed in many respects to Hartmann's, says that

although sharing neither Hartmann's metaphysics nor his ethical philosophy, he feels that this book in virtue of the detailed contributions it makes to specific ethical problems is the most important treatise on the subject in the present century.¹

The work is a valuable contribution to axiology and merits close analytical study. It is not easily read, at times is highly abstract, giving up its secrets only after much re-reading and reflection. But it is so full of significant

1. Hook, Art.(1930), 181.

content that such rereading and study is richly rewarding.

Hartmann's theory of value will be evaluated by considering the basic points of each of the expository chapters of the thesis together with alternative views on the points in question to determine which, if any, is the more satisfactory view. By more satisfactory view is understood that view which is the simplest account of ethical phenomena coherent with the phenomena of the whole of experience.

1. Criticism of the Value Realm

In Chapter I, it was seen that, according to Hartmann:

1. Values are ideal essences subsisting independent of consciousness or reality in a realm with its own order and laws.
2. Values are known to real subjects only a priori through an intuitive sense of value.
3. Values exhibit a tendency to be realized. This tendency expresses itself as an ideal Ought-to-Be attaching to every value, realized or unrealized. When the value is unrealized, a state of tension exists between the real and ideal spheres which is expressed as a positive Ought-to-Be.

Hartmann postulates the ideal, subsistent realm of values because he, like Kant, is convinced that universally valid ethical principles must not, indeed cannot be, derived from empirical sources, and he cannot accept the Kantian solution of a self-legislating will.

The Kantian solution has two difficulties for Hartmann,

besides its idealistic metaphysics. The first is the basic contradiction and threat to real freedom involved in the concept of self-legislation. The pure will, the transcendent universal part of the will, sets universal principles of conduct which are valid for the empirical will, the will which is influenced by the desires of the body. Now if the empirical will is free and the subject can heed or not heed the rational principles of the pure will, then an inconceivable contradiction arises in which the same subject both wills and wills-not to act in a certain way. On the other hand, if the empirical will is not free as against the legislation of the pure will, then freedom of the will, and all experience of pride, guilt, accountability, and responsibility are delusions. Neither of these alternatives is desirable to Hartmann.

Secondly, when Kant chose the legislation of a transcendent will in preference to what he considered the only other source of ethical principles, empirical data perceived by the senses, he erred. There was another alternative which was suggested by Plato's realm of Ideas and by the nature of logical and mathematical laws. This was the realm of essences. There the laws of ethical conduct could be found, as objective and universal as are these other laws. There beyond Being and not-Being, the subsistent essences are eternal and changeless, unaffected by reality or consciousness.

The alternative source of universally valid ethical principles which Hartmann posits, the realm of subsistent essences, is a difficult concept for the person not schooled in philosophical abstractions, and is construed as meaningless by many who do understand what is meant by it.

Concerning such a realm, Dewey says,

It is not possible to avoid the impression that the idea of such a realm is simply the hypostatizing in a wholesale way of the fact that actual existence has its own possibilities. But in any case devotion to such remote and unattached possibilities...becomes effective in relation to the conduct of life only when separation of essence from existence is cancelled; when essences are taken to be possibilities to be embodied through action in concrete objects of secure experience. Nothing is to be gained by reaching the latter through a circuitous route.²

If ideal essences cannot influence man except as they become ideas or are manifested in reality, then speculation concerning their pre-conceptual or pre-actual nature has little, if any, practical significance. The attempt to conceive them as beyond reality or consciousness seems an unnecessary and false abstraction which contributes nothing to the solution of the problems which concern the ethicist. It would seem that, despite his criticism and rejection of the Kantian metaphysic, Hartmann himself has developed, in the value realm, an axiological Ding-an-Sich. Such a realm and such a Ding-an-Sich may exist, but until they become effective and meaningful in the conscious and active life of man they are just so much idle speculation.

2. Dewey, QC, 306.

Walker criticizes Hartmann on this point, not, however, by denying meaning to a realm of subsistents, but by questioning the use of the term value to denote such remote and unattached essences. He says,

It is, of course, quite possible to conceive a world of essences enjoying that same objectivity and impersonality which seems...essential to logical essences and the objects of mathematics...The difficult point is in conceiving them as values in such lofty self-existence. Their reality apart from the human agent or thinker may not be difficult to grant. They may exist apart from the moral agent...but would they, even so, be values?³

Granting the metaphysical possibility of a realm of Ideas or essences, it is an unusual and highly questionable use of the term value to apply it to essences in abstraction.

According to Sorley,

when we predicate value of anything, we pass from the mere concept or essence of the thing, with its qualities, to a bearing which this essence has upon existence.⁴

Until an essence has bearing upon existence it cannot be called a value or valuable. Here, as in other fields of thought, man is limited by his humanity; all his thinking, and valuing, must be man-centered. Just as natural processes are judged by their effect upon man's welfare and comfort, so concepts or essences are considered values from man's viewpoint only as they effectively enter into the reality of which he is a part.

3. Walker, Art.(1938), 46-47.

4. Sorley, MVIG, 77.

This discussion serves to point out one very important weakness in Hartmann's presentation. Although his entire work on ethics is centered around values, and contains a detailed consideration of them, both as ideal essences and as existent in reality, he never defines the term, never tells what makes a value a value. In view of this omission, one has the right to supply one's own definition if it is one that gives a satisfactory account of the data of ethics. A consideration of some definitions of value is thus in order.

Perry defines value as "any object of any interest... That which is an object of interest is eo ipso invested with value."⁵ Value then is the quality of the object which arouses the interest, affects the motor-affective life of the subject.

Parker, while agreeing with Perry that value is relative to the subject, i.e., to his response or interest, does not agree that it is a quality of the object. He says,

Things may be valuable, they are not values. Value is always an experience, never a thing or object...Hence we should not define value..."as any object of any interest", but rather as "any interest in any object".⁶

Sorley says a thing has value or

is called good not merely because it exists, but in virtue of some quality or combination of qualities which distinguish it, or in some relation in which it stands to other things.⁷

5. Perry, GTV, 115.

6. Parker, Art.(1929), 305.

7. Sorley, MVIG, 86.

Brightman, more in accord with Perry and Sorley than Parker, defines value as "whatever [experience] is actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by anyone at any time."⁸

In all of these definitions of value, whether value is the object, a quality or qualities of the object, or a subject's interest or disposition toward the object, there is agreement on at least one thing, that value is not independent of ideal or real existence or of consciousness. As Walker puts it, "The very conception of value seems to be characterized by the relation to an agent for whom the value has the value that it has."⁹ Value is not an abstract ideal essence, but an important factor in subject-object relationship in reality. It is not independent of consciousness, but is either produced in it or perceived by it.

Hartmann's failure to define value may be in part the cause of the apparent ambiguity of the term as he uses it. At times he speaks of values as the ends of action which attract the subject, arousing him to commitment and activity. At other times he seems to speak of the realized values, the actual dispositions and conditions of real existents as values. While it may be Hartmann's intent to use value in this broad sense as both the universal concept and the particular realization of the concept, it is most confusing in view of

8. Brightman, POR, 88.

9. Walker, Art.(1938), 47.

the distinction which axiologists more commonly make between ideals and values. Both Iino¹⁰ and Millard¹¹ call attention to Hartmann's persistent confusion of the two terms. Iino quotes Brightman as saying, in personal correspondence,

When Hartmann speaks of values as essences, he is speaking of what I call ideals. Every valid ideal, indeed every concept of every sort, qua concept, is timeless in the sense of having a fixed and determinate meaning...But I do not regard an ideal as a value. An ideal is a valid concept of what would be a value if it were realized in temporal-personal experience...Hence I say that values are not fixed entities, but conscious fulfillments of ideals. The ideals themselves are fixed concepts (although I may be ignorant of what the valid fixed concept of justice is); but values are never mere concepts.¹²

This would seem a rather important distinction to make if one is to discuss value theory intelligibly.

But Hartmann's ideal essences, even when distinguished from their particular realizations, are not identical with what Brightman calls ideals. Hartmann would not stop at calling them concepts, but would place their original source beyond consciousness and reality, which Brightman would deny. Only when Hartmann's essences enter into consciousness as something that ought to be, do they coincide with Brightman's ideals. Thus, even if the distinction between ideals and values be understood, or clearly made, Hartmann's concept of values as beyond consciousness and existence is still a questionable conclusion.

10. Iino, CHE, 116-117.

11. Millard, TNHE, 49-50.

12. Iino, CHE, 116-117.

Apart from this, however, Hartmann's independent realm of values introduces into value theory the hoary problem of interaction. Descartes split reality into mind and matter and then was faced with the problem of how they could affect each other. He sought to solve it by the novel theory of the pineal gland so delicately balanced that it could be swayed by an idea. But his problem was simple compared to Hartmann's. Hartmann has something beyond Being and not-Being which somehow enters into Being and affects it. In Hartmann's theory, Descartes' pineal gland is replaced by a "dim consciousness" of value.

Actually, however, the consciousness of value is not an after thought used to bridge the gap between subsistence and existence, but is a primary ethical phenomenon, the primary phenomenon, the observance of which prompted Hartmann to look beyond the subject and beyond the empirical situation for its cause. The reality of this underived consciousness or sense of value really constitutes the whole of his argument for the objectivity of value.

This argument is based upon two aspects of the sense of value. One is its evaluating aspect, the sense of the worth of an object, relation, or action which accompanies every discernment of value. This function of the sense of value gives the subject the criterion by which, unreflectively, intuitively, he knows that the object of the judgment is good or bad, and to what degree it is either. This emotional

perception of a value standard is considered a priori by Hartmann. Without regard to any other experience, this experience of affirmation or negation is the judge of value. Regarding such independence of other experiences, Brightman says,

No truth can be said to be unqualifiedly a priori unless it is necessarily related to all experience in such a way that it is always valid no matter what happens...It is possible that some truths are universal and necessary; but this fact cannot be known prior to experiences of thinking and observing.¹³

The judgments of the sense of value are merely claims to validity, and are not the ultimate pronouncement of it. The claim of each value must be considered in the light of its effect on the whole of the subject's experience. To permit atomistic, unexamined, unrelated, emotional claims to determine one's conduct is to become incoherent and disorganized, which is the antithesis of virtue.

The feeling of the value or disvalue of an act or disposition is of course an accepted ethical phenomenon. But it is only a primary awareness of a possible actional alternative which is thus presented for consideration by the subject. It is what Brightman calls a value-claim. This term expresses the fact "that accompanying every value there is the explicit or implicit claim that the value now felt is a true value."¹⁴

After this claim has been considered in relation to other

13. Brightman, POR, 3-4.

14. Brightman, POR, 92.

value-claims and the other facts of experience, and has been found consistent and coherent with them, then this claim is sustained and regognized as a true value.

A true value, then, is what we still value after the testing of our empirical values by rational norms (rational meaning logically consistent and coherent), and after the tests of analysis, practical consequences, and coherent wholeness have been applied to the experience.¹⁵

That relation or act or attitude is valuable which is approved after rational consideration by the subject.

It seems likely that these intuitive value-claims are not messengers from the realm of essences, but are a priori, that is universal and necessary, in that they are normal reactions of the basic psychical and physiological nature of man to the stimuli of a given situation. Each of these impulses asserts its claim with all its strength, becoming tyrannical if given the chance, and must be controlled and ordered by reason in the light of the plan or end of the whole.

Much of the antinomical nature of the value realm which Hartmann reveals by his analysis may be traced directly to his acceptance of individual value-intuitions as independently valid rather than judging them in relation to the whole system of value experiences. He claims that his model is the Platonic concept of beholding Ideas. Iino, however, shows by an analysis of Platonic beholding that it is a dia-

15. Brightman, POR, 93.

lectical process which is synoptic and rational in nature and not the atomistic Wertgefühl which Hartmann describes.¹⁶

The second aspect of the sense of value which Hartmann cites as proof of the objectivity of values is negative in that it has to do with mistaken value-judgments and guilt. Hartmann argues that the very fact that one can make a mistake in judging a value, or can feel remorse or condemnation because of failure to realize it, is proof that there is a fixed standard. If values were subjective, there would be no error involved in value judgments for there would be no standard to use as a measure. Nor would one feel condemnation for failure to realize a value, but would rather lower the ideal to the level attained.

This proof of valuational objectivity is similar to Hartmann's reason for rejecting the Kantian doctrine of self-legislation by the will. He holds that the same will which gives the principle cannot then will-not to act in accordance with it. But just such willing and not-willing as that which he considers inconceivable is a far too common experience for nearly everyone. One may will to do better, to answer letters promptly, not to let work pile up, and then fail to do these things. One may be conscious of a better way of living, may commit oneself to it, and then not will the means to the end, and fall short. When what one might have been and aspired to be is contrasted with what one is,

16. Iino, CHE, 119-122.

the truth of willing and not-willing is evident, and the sense of falling short of self-imposed ideals brings its own condemnation to any person who is still morally sensitive.

The recognition of an error in valuation has no place, logically, in Hartmann's theory, for a value judgment cannot be recognized as wrong unless it is considered in relation to other judgments and experiences, which is precisely the synoptic and coherent consideration which Brightman insists must be applied to all value-claims. Thus Iino says,

This argument for objectivity is a repudiation of the appeal to intuition alone, and is essentially an argument based on discriminations between coherent and incoherent intuitions.¹⁷

Hence, Hartmann indirectly admits the inadequacy of the atomistic intuition, recognizing that the subject must in some way discriminate between value-claims or be at the mercy of every whim that ripples the waters of his consciousness.

From the foregoing discussion it may now be seen that values are not ideal essences, independent of consciousness and reality. It is meaningless to speak of values apart from consciousness, at least, for values are something for a mind. Values are produced in or perceived by conscious subjects and apply to real relations or objects. While general types of experience which are valued may be held as ideals, value always is found in particulars.

17. Iino, CHE, 113.

The intuitive sense of value is not the only means by which value is known. It is only the primary awareness of something which claims to be valuable. But true value, is known only through a rational examination of value-claims. Values are those value claims which have been so tested and found coherent with other values, other types of experience, and the ultimate goal of the valuing subject.

The tendency of every value to be realized which Hartmann calls the ideal Ought-to-Be is nothing more nor less than the claim, perfectly valid, of every natural desire to be satisfied. Hartmann makes it quite clear that all of these values are values, and only become disvalues as they cause the subject to neglect higher values. So it is that every natural desire presents a value-claim which must be examined by reason and accepted and harmonized with other claims, or rejected for the sake of the end of the whole.

If the "methodological drapery" of the realm of values is stripped away, together with the atomistic intuition as sole criterion of values, what remains is the concept of values, or more correctly, ideals as independent of the individual consciousness. This objectivity may have its basis in the social order or in the dictates of rational thought or experience. In addition, there is the recognition of the primary experience of value-claims as emotional, a dim consciousness or feeling of value, together with the assertion that every value-claim ought to be, ideally, even if

the actional limitations prevent such ideal realization.

2. Criticism of Value Realization

The significant points of Hartmann's theory of value realization as stated in Chapter II of this thesis are as follows:

1. It is ontologically possible for a subject to be causally determined and yet be free to strive to realize self-chosen ends.
2. Values are realized by such subjects who are, in addition, responsive to the sense of values.
3. The subject becomes a person through the part he plays in value realization.

Hartmann defines freedom "in the positive sense" as a result of the addition of a new, non-causal determination to the existing causal definition. As long as the outcome of the conflict between the two is in doubt, man has a choice, is free. This definition of freedom is in harmony with the thought of most contemporary ethicists. Although free will is still popularly conceived in the negative sense as freedom from external restraint, or indeterminism, most serious thinkers who have considered the problem are agreed that "indeterminism, far from being the guarantee of freedom, is the contradiction of it."¹⁸ Freedom, to have any meaning, must

18. Means, Art.(1936), 88.

be understood to be the ability of the subject to initiate a series of events leading to a desired effect. If there is no dependable relation between cause and effect, any actual achievement of ends is a matter of accident or coincidence. Hence the causal nexus is a necessary presupposition of effective action, ethical or otherwise.

On this point, determinists and exponents of free will (not indeterminists) are agreed. But the determinist views the whole of reality, including man, as an unbroken causal nexus in which every element or event is completely determined in every detail by antecedent events or factors.

Most of the exponents of free will, Hartmann included, agree that the causal nexus is universally determinant, that man, like all other real subjects, is determined in his conduct by his hereditary physical and psychological nature, the social environment and ethos in which his lot is cast, past decisions and conduct, and the limitations of the specific situation in which he must make a choice. But they hold that man, by virtue of the time-transcending power of thought, may introduce a new determinant in the form of anticipation of ends or ideals which are not yet realized. Whether these ends or ideals are formulated by a transcendent reason or discerned by an intuitive sense of values, man's awareness of them is the key to his freedom from the "push" of the past, even though it may be determination by the "pull" of the future.

The theory of freedom as a result of an excess or plurality of determination rather than a lack of it, was the Kantian answer to the determinism of his day. No great changes are made in it by Hartmann, or others who argue the case for freedom today. Hartmann's real contribution is his analysis of the relations of the categories of being, the stronghold of determinism, finding thereby that the freedom claimed for man was not something special, but was an example of a type of categorial freedom commonly found wherever a new and more complex category is developed out of a simpler, more elemental category.

By this analysis, Hartmann shows that a subject may be considered as a physical organism, and as such be determined by the laws which are determinant for organisms. Indeed, if the subject lives on the physical level and considers himself an animal, he is determined by his animal nature. But it must also be remembered that he is more than an animal by virtue of his sensitivity to ideals and his ability to be determined by what is not real and hence non-causal. In so far as he lives and acts in accordance with the determination of this realm, the laws or explanatory principles of the lower, animal level are inadequate to account for his conduct.

Just as the mechanical formulae of inorganic nature are inadequate to plant life, and the formulae of plant life to the more complex life of the animal kingdom, so other and still more complex formulae, we hold, must be conceived as expressing the activities of the conscious, reasoning self, rising as it does above all these lower grades of

being.¹⁹

It is quite likely that the laws of this higher, more complex category of being will be more or less clearly understood in time. But it is certain that the simple sequential succession of mechanical causality is not adequate to the task.

Hartmann's argument for the ontological possibility of freedom rests upon his categorial laws and upon the feelings of freedom, guilt, responsibility, etc., which are definite ethical data. This latter basis is all unverifiable, first-hand experience which the determinist must regard as subjective illusion. But Werkmeister, who reaches conclusions almost identical with Hartmann's through a detailed study of the methods and findings of science, points out that the very fact that these feelings are subjective experiences, places the burden of the proof back upon the determinist who must give an explanation of their appearance in a subject who is completely determined. These and kindred feelings are all acceptable evidence of freedom until they can be satisfactorily accounted for on deterministic grounds, since they could certainly be explained by freedom.²⁰

Werkmeister goes on to point out that the scientist formulates a hypothesis, deduces its consequences, verifies them experimentally, and thus assumes the hypothesis to be proven valid.

19. Everett, MV, 350-351.

20. See Werkmeister, PS, 434-437.

If we apply this same line of reasoning to our problem, the situation is something like this: Our hypothesis is that man is free. From this hypothesis we derive the assertions (1) that man should feel free; (2) that he should have a feeling of authorship and of responsibility; (3) that he should have a sense of guilt; (4) that moral conceptions are meaningful; and (5) that standards of conduct and norms of thinking are not empty words. All these 'consequences' of our hypothesis we find verified in first hand experience and in societal living. Therefore we assert that our hypothesis has been verified with a high degree of probability.²¹

At least such argumentation restores subjective experience to some degree of respectability as not to be lightly regarded, but rather seriously considered.

Regarding the categorial laws, particularly the law of novelty or freedom, Werkmeister has more to say. He discusses the different levels of life and determination from the "collision" type determination of simple inorganic elements to the determination by "motivation" at the human level. He says

It is important, however, that each level of determination contains an irreducible novum and is therefore inexplicable in terms of the levels below it...That is to say, at each level something happens which is impossible at all lower levels and which, in this sense, is free from the exclusive and complete determination by factors of the lower levels.²²

At the human level, this novum is seen in the fact that ideas of things or relations can be determinant as the things or relations themselves. Anticipated consequences, as well as

21. Werkmeister, PS, 437-438.

22. Werkmeister, PS, 440.

antecedent causes, influence man's conduct.

Man is free from the complete determination by actually existing factors and forces because his actions are also guided by 'ideals' and by his anticipation of that which is to be, or which will come about, as a result of the very actions so determined.²³

Such freedom violates no law of lower levels since it is merely the addition of further determining factors to the causal nexus.

Thus Hartmann has an able second for his doctrine of freedom. But it must be pointed out that these arguments have not proven freedom of the will, but only the ontological possibility of some new kind of determination at the human level. The freedom to reject the law of one's level, which is freedom of the will, has no counterpart at other levels, and is not provided by the categorial freedom. As Stock puts it,

Professor Hartmann's candid and perspicuous argument throws new light on many dark places; yet at the end the clouds gather and one feels that in essentials thought still halts at the limits which Kant marked for it, confident only that freedom is an essential demand of the moral consciousness, and that no valid refutation of the demand is forthcoming.²⁴

But Hartmann's analysis of the problem and his deduction of the categorial laws which lend support to his theory have set the problem well and give the hypothesis of freedom a high degree of probability.

23. Werkmeister, PS, 442.

24. Stock, Rev.(1932), 476.

Since this doctrine of freedom requires at least two kinds of determination, Hartmann finds it necessary to reject both causal and finalistic monisms. This reason alone would, of course, be insufficient, but he justified this rejection on the grounds that these monisms violate one or more of the basic categorial laws. Causal monism denies the law of novelty or freedom, while finalistic monism emphasizes this law, denying the law of strength.

In this connection it may be said that it is regrettable that Hartmann failed to consider a teleology which was not fixed and certain, but which requires the co-operation of man to realize its end. His attack on universal, almost pantheistic teleology is of course justified. But his mechanistic interpretation of the world, with the one exception of an ideal-motivated human teleology, assumes too much and leaves too much unaccounted for. It is possible, and sometimes desirable, for the ethicist to ignore or postpone ultimate metaphysical problems, to accept the existence of the world, the causal nexus, and its apparent conformity to human ends, and develop an empirical ethic within the framework given. But since Hartmann has chosen to discuss metaphysical issues, he is open to the charges usually made against those who give a mechanistic account of the world.

A consideration of these charges, and of the teleological alternative is not within the scope of this thesis. Millard deals with this problem in detail,²⁵ as does Iino, who de-

25. Millard, *TNHE*, Chapter III.

votes a large portion of his study of the Ethik to a consideration of Hartmann's reasons for atheism.²⁶ The thoroughness of these studies makes it unnecessary to consider these problems further. Attention is called, particularly, to Iino's presentation of a theism and a teleology which Hartmann does not consider, but which leaves man's freedom untouched, in fact requires it and his voluntary co-operation for the realization of its ends.

If it is understood that Hartmann means ideals when he speaks of values, then his account of the journey of a value from its ideality to reality is an interesting and fairly accurate psychological account of how ideals become determinant for man. If Hartmann's subsistent realm were discarded, which it may well be without any great loss to the remainder of his theory, the positive Ought-to-Be may be understood as the ideals or ends of the group or society to which the subject belongs, ideals he may approve but believe impractical. When his interest in an ideal is aroused either by his emotions or by recognition of its desirability, and when he can by his efforts realize or aid in the realization of the ideal, then it becomes an Ought-to-Do.

It is at this point that Hartmann is forced to admit the subjective element to enter his theory. The Ought, the ideal or the value cannot compel the subject to accede to its

26. Iino, CHE, Chapter III.

demands. He may deny the obligation which he feels. As Walker says,

The man himself must be permitted to choose which value he shall accept and...he must be permitted to deny or refuse to follow a given value. Surely this position comes dangerously close to saying that in the last analysis it is the interest of the person, his own choice of the value as a force in his own life, which constitutes it as a value for him in the situation.²⁷

While Hartmann would deny this conclusion, he is forced to admit that "the attitude of the subject to the Ought is the central point in the ethical problem."²⁸

A further subjective, or empirical element is added to the theory by the fact that the subject is only obligated by the Ought when he can realize its value by his own efforts, something which can only be empirically determined, both from past experiences and accomplishments, and the conditions of the present situation. This empirical element is also important in connection with the second step in the finalistic series Hartmann describes. The subject determines the means to the anticipated end by a step-by-step return from it, as conceived in consciousness, to the present. Certainly intuition would need the support and guidance of past experience in the causal nexus to determine the most suitable and efficient means to the end.

Thus the really important point in Hartmann's considera-

27. Walker, Art., (1938), 48.

28. Hartmann, ETH, 261.

tion of the subject's role in value realization is his admission of subjective and empirical factors which are necessary to bring the value across the gap between the ideal and the real realms.

Man, by his sensitivity to ideals, imparts to reality, a richness and meaning which it lacks without him, regardless of one's world-view. "The amount of value or goodness which actually exists in the world is dependent, to some extent at least, upon the volition of man."²⁹ If life be regarded as a creative achievement or process which may add to the sum and value of existence, then

our instrument for this is to be found in those ideal anticipations of the future in which the forward-looking side of human nature takes shape under the guidance of a rational deliberation from which new insight and action emerge.³⁰

Man, the value-sensing, may become man, the value-realizing, and thus a co-creator of value and existence.

According to Hartmann, man's attainment of ethical personality is a result of his freedom and his character which is built up by the valuational marks which he retains in his acts. Actually, man's freedom which comes through voluntary commitment to ideals is the condition of personality. The ethical personality itself, or the "character" of the subject, is the nature of the subject which has been shaped by the things or values to which the subject is committed. The sub-

29. Sorley, MVIG, 166.

30. Rogers, TE, 104.

ject tends to become what he most desires to be. If this is to be an animal, and his commitment is to his animal desires, then his personality will bear the marks of animality. But if he has committed himself to the highest and best in his nature and society, his personality will reflect those ideals which he pursues. Thus Hartmann has rightly defined that which constitutes ethical personality or character. A man's character is the objective manifestation of the principles around which his life is organized.

3. Criticism of Moral Values

When one considers that portion of the Ethics in which Hartmann analyzes the narrower sphere of moral values, his true genius is apparent. His thorough analysis of the particular ethical values reveals a wealth of valuable information concerning their content and relations, the usefulness and validity of which does not depend upon the validity of his theory of value.

The most important points of this analysis are:

1. Moral values are never directly striven for, but are always by-products of the striving for goods.
2. Any object which may be striven for, or quality of either the subject or reality which makes striving possible, is thus of value because it makes possible the attainment of moral values.
3. A feeling of valuational grade accompanies the primal

feeling of value. This is proof that the scale of values is as fixed and unalterable as the values themselves.

4. All of the insights into the nature and gradation of values which constitute the ethos of various historic civilizations must be fitted into the scale of values.

5. Goodness is the commitment of the subject to the higher value in a given situation. The strength of his commitment and striving determines the quality or degree of goodness of his acts.

6. The ultimate values are radiant virtue, personality, and personal love.

7. This analysis reveals certain structural relations or laws of the moral value sphere and the value realm in general. These laws are the laws of stratification and foundation, opposition and complementation, valuation-height and valuation-strength.

That Hartmann's ethic is an ethic of intention rather than an ethic of consequence is evident from the point he makes concerning the manner in which moral values are realized. They appear "on the back of the deed" and are not in the intended value. The intention of the subject determines the morality of his action. There is no doubt that the intention of the subject is one of the major factors to be considered in evaluating the world of his acts. But the consequences of his acts for himself and for others also deserve consideration. These consequences may be such as to oppose or destroy the value of the intention. Thus, a well-meaning

reformer might bring about the reforms which he thinks necessary and desirable, but which might in reality be undesirable.

Even if the consequences of his act prove the subject to be mistaken in his intention, Hartmann says that this does not determine the worth of the intention. From his point of view, the important thing is to have values realized, and the intention of the subject to realize what he mistakenly conceives to be of value is itself a value. But the subject acts in society and not in a vacuum, and his acts, however well-meant, will affect the conduct and well-being of others. Hence consequences cannot be ignored in assigning moral worth to acts. The subject has an obligation to consider all the foreseeable consequences of his acts. This must be included in his attitude or intention if it is to be morally good. Though he may consider all the foreseeable consequences, other unforeseen consequences may appear which would make the value he intends undesirable if realized.

Goodness, for Hartmann, is the direction of the intention to the higher value in a given situation. However, it now appears that a good act must contain more than a good intention. It must also contain a conviction that this act is higher because its consequences are more desirable than those of any other possible alternative values in the situation. All this implies that what has been said previously concerning Hartmann's intuitive sense of value, namely that

it is too atomistic, applies equally well to his criterion of moral worth and his scale of values.

Man, as a realizer of values, is axiologically superior to things which are valuable to him as objects which may be striven for. Personal value, situational value, or other object may become a "good", i. e., may be considered as of moral value or significance because it provides the occasion for attainment of moral value. A beautiful object has its own value as a thing of beauty, but when it becomes a valued object, it may cause the subject to develop various personal attitudes and habits which affect his character negatively or positively. Thus the beautiful object is given an additional value. For the same reason the qualities of the subject, such as consciousness, and of existence, such as situations demanding choice, are morally significant as occasions for altering the moral content of a subject.

In this way every kind of value is or may be related to character and conduct...All values--the intellectual and aesthetic among the rest--have also a share in moral value because they heighten personal worth and are, to some extent at least, within the reach of personal endeavor.³¹

It must be said, however, that if this process were carried out to its logical conclusion, all of reality would have an ideal essence in the realm of value, which would render this realm meaningless as such. It would merely be another name for the realm of reality viewed as the means to personal

31. Sorley, MVIG, 165.

value attainment.

Hartmann, of course, rejects the idea that these conditional values are valuable as means to the personal development of the subject. Yet many of his difficulties would disappear if he would only admit that man's axiology must be man-centered and must be organized around man's interests.

But rather than consider the theory that all things are valuable, at least as far as man is concerned, only to the extent to which they contribute to the development of his personality, his highest self-realization, Hartmann insists that the only valid means of determining the rank of values is by the feeling of grade which accompanies the primal sensing of values. Here again his atomism dominates his thought. The grade of the value is fixed regardless of the situation, even though in the same situation what is the highest value for one individual may be a disvalue for another. The individual must be guided in his choices by the feeling of grade. This is an even more definite rejection of consequences as criteria of moral worth than that previously given.

Hartmann cites the feeling of grade concomitant with the sense of value as proof of the fixity of the scale of values. This is not however proof of his point for this feeling of the relative rank of valuational alternatives, like the sense of values, has its basis in the nature of the individual and in the social environment in which he matures. His preference

for one alternative may be a result of the operation of natural likes and dislikes, or it may be the result of negative or positive influence of the attitude of the groups to which he belongs towards these alternatives. The feeling itself is no proof of the place of the value in the whole, but it is only one claim presented on behalf of one alternative.

No intelligent decision can be made without considering this feeling-sponsored alternative in relation to the self in all of its relations and aims. "One is never certain about the greatest good in any situation until one has taken everything into account."³² Hartmann does attempt by his analysis of the moral values to get beyond the atomistic intuition of value by the individual. But when he tries to assemble the results of his analysis into a synoptic whole, he considers only the inter-relations of values and not their relation to the whole of experience.

Hartmann's difficulty in regard to valuational grade and valuational conflicts stems from his denial of any supreme purpose, either in man or in the cosmos. The nearest he comes to this idea is when he speaks of man as being guided in his conduct by his "morally super-empirical essence, his inner determination, his Idea...In accordance with it, he tries to live, that is to form his empirical being."³³ If Hartmann had followed through on this idea, his system would

32. Brightman, ITP, 144.

33. Hartmann, ETH, I, 199.

have been far more coherent.

The idea of a fixed scale of values has been largely replaced by the idea of a system of values organized around a dominant aim or interest. When the subject of values thinks rationally about his life, he

does also attempt to systematise his values: partly deliberately, partly unconsciously, he gradually forms a dominating conception which determines his conduct and his view of what is of greatest worth. Under this dominant conception, he will arrange other conceptions contributory to value in his life, and will negative suggestions which interfere with that value.³⁴

What is of primary importance is the worth of the whole, and the elements which make it up are valued to the degree that they supplement it better than some other possible value.

Brightman suggests as a working criterion of valuation-al grade the following standard: "that value is, in any given situation, the highest which contributes most to the coherent functioning and organization of experience as a whole."³⁵

Both his view and that of Sorley, point up the glaring weakness of any system or theory, such as Hartmann's, which would establish a fixed scale of values without regard for man's ultimate end or desires.

That which is permanent and universal in morality is not found in fixed values or prescribed classes of conduct valid in all circumstances. It is in the spirit which is

34. Sorley, MVIG, 52.

35. Brightman, ITP, 144.

found wherever men guide their conduct by principles rather than impulse. It is "essentially an active attitude--a striving towards the realization of the best conceived."³⁶ Then those values which are coherent with this best may be fitted into the system, members of it only because they contribute to the realization of the best, and ranked by their relative utility in this realization.

Hartmann's analysis of valuational antinomies is valuable for its clear, detailed presentation of the various tensions of life. Yet many of these could be and are resolved in practice, by viewing them from the standpoint of an ultimate dominant interest. Hartmann considers the possibility of such a supreme value, but puts it aside as not justified by the data. The individual must construct some sort of system of interests if he is to act effectively. The sense of value also tends toward synthesis in every situation, but the unresolved valuational antinomies do not justify the ethicist's drawing of similar conclusions.

The conflict of value with value of which Hartmann makes much, is a direct result of his failure to differentiate between value-claims and true values, and to recognize the organization of values around a dominant purpose. Many of the values which seem to conflict will be recognized as not coherent with the purpose of the self and will be ruled

36. Sorley, MVIG, 148.

out as false values. The values which still would be coherent with the whole of experience and of equal value to the end of the self then may be regarded not as disproof of unity, but as providing a variety of materials which the individual chooses to add to his life in accordance with his own individual preferences. Thus the artist, the philosopher, the statesman, may each realize his best self in his own unique way.

Other antinomies may be similarly resolved by the subject in accordance with his own concept of the best, the ideals and ethos of his time and place, and finally his own individual nature.

In contrast to Hartmann's emphasis upon the opposition and conflict of values, Brightman lays stress upon the interpenetration and coalescence of values.

Each has a unique quality of its own to contribute to the total value experience and yet each tends to coalesce with the others...In fact, the fusion and coalescence of values with each other is such that one might be inclined to deny that there are any separate and distinct values at all...This line of thought points toward the conclusion that there is really only one value, namely, the systematic whole of our value experience.³⁷

The validity of this concept is evident from the fact that no rational being would be satisfied with any one value if it were stripped of all its content which comes from other values. Surprisingly enough, in view of the important part

37. Brightman, POR, 100-101.

which the atomistic sense of values and valuational antinomies play in his presentation, Hartmann comes quite close to a like view when he considers the unity and order which his analysis reveals.

In the ultimate virtue or virtues, Hartmann arrives at practically the same conclusion that others who have studied the ethical phenomena in detail have reached. The ultimate virtues, which are radiant virtue, personality, and personal love, when considered as a unity, closely approximate the concept of self-realization as the highest value. By striving for the general values in his own individual way, the subject attains his personality. Radiant virtue flows from the fulness of life that is devoted to the realization of values. It reveals the truth that the real meaning of life is in life itself as a process of value realization. In the virtue of personal love Hartmann recognizes the need of personality for appreciation. Perhaps this longing to be understood, to be appreciated, is ultimately part of the reason that man hungers for a cosmic person who will know and understand his trials and who will love him with an appreciative understanding love.

The most fruitful part of Hartmann's study of moral values for axiology is found in his summary of the regularities or laws revealed by his analysis. Here his peculiar genius for analysis reveals itself, supplemented by a tendency to synthesis which was lacking previously. Perhaps

this is a result of the pronounced tendency of the valuational conflicts to be resolved in syntheses.

The results obtained in the analysis of the stratification and foundation relationship are nothing more than what would be expected. The categorial laws of the sphere of being are found, interestingly enough, to be applicable to those values which condition contents, or values which are for the most part real objects and thus subject to categorial law. But above the conditioning relation, the purely moral values are evidently ruled by a different kind of law.

The oppositional and complementary value relations reveal tendencies which offer strong support for the theory held by Brightman,³⁸ Everett,³⁹ Sorley,⁴⁰ and others that values are not independent of each other, but that they interpenetrate or coalesce. When the oppositional relations are thoroughly analysed they reveal the fact that no one of the values considered by itself is a virtue, indeed may become a vice unless it is counterbalanced by its opposite. It is from the syntheses of single moral values, which taken alone are tyrannical, that virtues are produced. Thus a synthesis of justice and brotherly love serves to remove the blindfold from the eyes of justice and to temper it with mercy while saving love from maudlin sentimentality. The true fulfill-

38. Brightman, POR, 100-101, 104-105.

39. Everett, MV, 183.

40. Sorley, MVIG, 510-511.

ment of any one value then is in its ultimate synthesis with all values. The same need for other values is discovered in the complementary relations. Personality is only fulfilled in personal love, trustworthiness in trust. Thus wisdom, justice, brotherly-love, love of the remote, all these might be considered as virtue-possibilities, and only one who possessed them all, plus the lower values would be considered virtuous.

As a result of the pronounced tendency and need for synthesis, Hartmann suggests that the higher ranks belong to the more complex syntheses. This is quite similar to Perry's principle of inclusiveness, "the principle that a and b are greater than a."⁴¹

The categorial laws of dependence, considered in relation to values serve to make clear the necessity for considering the whole of value experience and not just its upper or lower reaches. The lower values are necessary if any higher values are to be attained, but praiseworthy moral conduct is that in which the higher values are attained. Hartmann still insists that the lower values do not derive their meaning from this relation. But all values may be viewed as valuable only in their relation to the ultimate value, whatever that may be. If it is self-realization, then all the values from life itself up through love of the remote

41. Perry, Art.(1931), 451.

are valuable only as instruments by which the realization proceeds. But this highest value will be secure only if it is based upon a firm foundation, and includes within itself all the parts of which it is the whole. In this final synthesis all the values are intrinsic in their identity with the ultimate value.

SUMMARY

1. Values, according to Hartmann, are subsistent ideal essences independent of consciousness or reality. But values are for a mind, are produced in or perceived by conscious subjects, and are always conceived as existent and are found only in particulars. When Hartmann speaks of values apart from their particular realization, he means ideals or concepts of general types of experience which are desired. But even ideals are concepts and therefore in consciousness.

2. The intuitive, a priori sense of value which Hartmann holds to be the only means by which values are known is only the primary awareness of something which thus presents a value-claim. These value-claims are accepted as true values only after they have been examined in relation to the whole of experience and found coherent with other values, other types of experience, and the dominant purpose of the valuing subject.

3. The Ought-to-Be which attaches to every value is the claim of every natural desire to be satisfied. Ideally, all such desires should be satisfied, but in the individual, some must be rejected and all must be controlled and harmonized for the sake of the whole.

4. Man is causally determined as a real subject, but it is ontologically possible for him to be "positively" free if he is determined by a non-causal determination. Man's sensitivity to ideals and values provides this determination which

is the key to his freedom.

5. Though Hartmann hopes to place values beyond all subjectivity by positing the ideal realm of values, subjectivity makes its re-entrance via the theory of freedom in regard to the Ought-to-Be of values. Only when the subject desires a value for himself or others and can realize it by striving is he obligated by it, and even then he may deny it.

6. Man attains ethical personality, or character, by virtue of his freedom and the valuational marks which he retains in his acts. He builds his character by striving for values to which he has voluntarily committed himself. His character is the objective manifestation of the principles around which his life is organized.

7. Moral values are never directly striven for, but are always by-products of the striving for goods. They are qualities of the intention and not the intended value. But if the intention alone is to determine the moral quality of an act, it must unclude the consideration of all foreseeable consequences. Unforeseeable consequences do not affect the moral quality of the act.

8. Any object which may be striven for, or any quality of either the subject or reality which makes striving possible, is thus of value because it makes possible the attainment of moral values.

9. The feeling of valuational grade which accompanies

the primal sense of value is proof of a fixed and absolute scale of values. This is too atomistic. The grade of values can only be determined in relation to the dominant interest or purpose of the valuing subject and to the whole of experience. All that is fixed in morality is the spirit which is found wherever men guide their conduct by principles rather than impulse. It is a striving towards the realization of the best conceived.

10. Goodness is the commitment of the subject to the higher value in a given situation. The strength of his commitment and striving determines the quality or degree of goodness of his acts.

11. The ultimate virtues according to Hartmann are radiant virtue, personality, and personal love. These virtues, considered as a unity, closely approximate the concept of self-realization as the highest value.

12. Hartmann's analysis reveals certain structural laws of the moral value sphere and the value realm in general. These laws are: the laws of stratification and foundation, opposition and complementation, valuational-height and valuational strength. These laws reveal a tendency and a need for synthesis of values, and the importance of both higher and lower values, the whole of value experience for the highest possible self-realization.

A SUMMARY OF THE VIRTUES

A. Fundamental Virtues

1. Goodness--is the preference for the higher value in a given situation. The intention of a purposive being to values is the only thing which as such is good or bad.
2. Nobility--is the conscious pursuit of the uncommon among values, the pursuit of those values which tend to raise a man above the common level of goodness.
3. Richness of experience--as a virtue is the tendency to do inward justice to life by appreciative participation in all that it has to offer, including both good and bad.
4. Purity--is frankness, innocence, lack of duplicity in conduct, word, and thought. The impulse to preserve one's innocence by turning away from the lower values is the moral element in purity.

B. Platonic Virtues

1. Justice--is the disposition of the individual to grant to all men the basic conditions for moral life and growth, the acceptance of responsibility to sustain and improve communal order and equality of opportunity.
2. Wisdom--is an appreciative recognition of life's richness and commitment to sensitive participation in it, ever seeking a greater awareness of it.
3. Courage--is the deliberate, steadfast staking of one's life upon one's choice of values and willingness to bear responsibility for the consequences of one's acts.
4. Self-control--is the control and direction of the affections for the welfare of the whole of which they are a part, capacity for inner self-direction.

C. Aristotelian Virtues

1. Moderation--is keeping within limits avoiding both emotional dullness and licentiousness.
2. Liberality in Giving--is the mean between penuriousness and extravagance.
3. Mildness--is the mean between easy excitability to anger

and complete incapacity to feel wrath.

4. Magnificence--is a virtue peculiar to one who has great possessions and is a mean between shabbiness and vulgar display.

5. Ambition--is the mean between lack of ambition and an excess of it.

6. Magnanimity--is moral pride or self-appreciation based upon genuine greatness and worth.

7. Giving to each his due--is a right attitude towards another's enjoyment or suffering in proportion to his worthiness and desert.

8. The sense of shame--is an immature sense of value and right and restrains one from acts of which one would be ashamed.

D. The Christian Virtues

1. Brotherly love--is an interested concern for others because of their human potentiality, transcending justice and placing the other's welfare upon a level with one's own.

2. Truthfulness--is the intention to express what one thinks or believes.

3. Reliability and Fidelity--is the intention and capacity to keep one's promises in the future regardless of one's later desires.

4. Trust and Faith--Trust is the surrender of one's personality to another and is based upon faith in his promises. It has the miraculous power of creating a desire in its object to live up to it.

5. Modesty--is reticence in the presence of another in recognition of his moral worth and of one's own unworthiness.

6. Humility--is consciousness of falling short of one's own ideals, balanced by pride in having aimed high.

7. Aloofness--is an attitude of respect for another's personality and a refusal to invade the privacy of his innermost being even when the way is open to do so.

E. Other Virtues

1. Love of the remote--is commitment to values which can only be realized in the distant future, even at the cost of sacrificing much that is near and dear. It is a great expression of faith in the future.

2. Radiant virtue--is the attitude of one who is so filled with spiritual riches that he must impart them to others. It is the rich, vibrant overtone of a harmonious life.

3. Personality--as a virtue is the striving for the best and highest values according to one's own knowledge of them in one's own unique way, thus bringing into being values which none other can realize.

4. Personal love--is the disposition to trust the one loved, to serve by making the actual self loved correspond more and more closely to the ideal being revealed by love.

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